企业产品制假行为的监管制度博弈分析

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3.0 刘畅 2024-11-07 6 4 631.44KB 48 页 15积分

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摘要

自从我国施行从计划经济到以市场经济为主导的经济改革体制以来，我国的

经济水平获得了快速的发展，人们的生活水平得到了很大的提高；但是，随着经

济水平和科技水平的增长，市场上制假售假现象也随之出现，并出现了快速的蔓

延，涉及到了人们生活的方方面面。制假售假现象不仅侵犯了合法经营的企业的

正当权益，损害了消费者的利益；破坏了正常的市场经济秩序，扰乱了我国市场

经济的健康发展，而且破坏了社会的公平公正，对合法经营者的社会生产带来很

大的危害。

本文的重点是探究企业产品制假行为对我国企业以及消费者产生的影响。

论文从当前我国市场经济情况出发，首先指出了在当前我国经济快速发展的

过程中，制假售假不断出现这一现象，列出制假售假行为对企业和消费者以及对

我国市场经济带来的危害，从而指出打击制假售假的必要性。

其次从消费者、企业生产者以及相关监督机构等角度分析了我国当前制假售

假行为不断出现而得不到有效制止的原因；接着在国内外专家学者研究的基础上，

运用经济学、信息经济学、行为经济学等理论，阐述了制假造假现象产生的根源。

从企业制造商角度，市场经济实行以来，由于社会经济制度的不健全，一些企业

开始利用制度漏洞制假造假，攫取高额利润；从消费者方面发现，一方面由于我

国消费文化环境和消费习惯的原因，知假买假现象时有发生，这就在一定程度上

鼓励了假品生产商；另一方面，市场上交易双方信息不对称，大部分消费者没有

足够的信息，对商品的真伪很难判断，只能在价格和价值的比对下进行决策，这

就为假品制造商提供了一个可乘之机。

本文运用完全信息静态博弈、无限重复博弈、演化博弈论、不完全信息动态

博弈等博弈工具,本文分别在企业生产者和消费者、制假造假生产商和正品生产商

以及执法监督机构和产品生产商之间分别建立博弈模型，并进一步对模型进行了

相关的博弈分析，以期通过博弈分析找出降低制假售假行为的对策措施。

最后，根据博弈分析结果，能够得出：一方面，价格因素在一定程度上能够

减少社会中制假造假行为的发生，例如降低正品的价格，这样可以在一定程度上

扩大消费者的购买行为；另一方面，通过社会监督、加大执法力度等方式提高假

品制造商的成本，这样可以有效减少假品在市场的流动。另外，加强产品质量检

查和产品信息的宣传，对消费者的购买行为进行一定的指导和约束，也可以减少

社会中制假造假行为的发生。

关键词：制假行为，监管，制度，博弈分析

ABSTRACT

Since our country has executed the reform of the Economic System which is from

a planned economy to a market economy who acts the essential role, China's economic

level obtained rapid development, people's living standards have been greatly improved;

But along with the growth of the economic and the technology, the phenomenon of the

market counterfeit appears and spreads quickly in all aspects of people’s lives. The

phenomenon of the market counterfeit not only infringes the legitimate rights of the

lawful business enterprise and harms the benefits of consumers, but also destroys the

normal market economy order, disrupting the healthy development of China's market

economy. Besides, it also undermines the fair and equitability of the society which

brings great harm to the social production of the legitimate operators.

The article focuses on exploring the impact that the corporate product

counterfeiting behavior has on the Chinese enterprises as well as consumers. Papers

from China's market economy.

Firstly, the article introduces the phenomenon that the market counterfeiting

behavior emerges in the process of China's rapid economic development, lists out the

harm that the counterfeiting behavior brings to the enterprises, consumers and to the

market economy. And then points out the necessary of cracking down on fake goods

product behavior.

Secondly，the article the reason why the market counterfeit behavior still exists

without a valid stop from the point of view of consumers ,enterprises and the

supervisors. Then on the basis of the research that the domestic and foreign experts and

scholars has made, using some theories such as economics information economics and

behavioral economics, the article presented the root cause of this counterfeiting

phenomenon. From the corporate point of view, some companies began to take

advantage of loopholes in the system which is still not perfect, in order to grab high

profits. From the consumers’ point of view, on the one hand, consumers prefer to

purchase the fake goods due to our countries consumer culture and consumer

environment, which to some extent encourages the fake goods producers. On the other

hand, the asymmetric information leads to the facts that the consumers haven’t enough

information to distinguish the true from the false. Consumers can only decides

comparing the price of the products with the value they themselves thought, which also

provides an opportunity to the fake-goods manufacturers.

Thirdly, using the tools of the game theory, such as Static game of complete

information, Infinitely repeated games, Evolutionary game theory, Incomplete

information dynamic game, the article respectively makes game model between the

corporate producers and consumers, counterfeiting and fraud producers and also

between genuine manufacturers and supervision of law enforcement agencies，analysis

the model in order to find out the strategies and measures of reducing the counterfeiting

phenomenon.

Finally, according to the game results, the paper got the conclusion. On the one

hand, the price, for example, reducing the price of the genuine goods can extend the

consumers’ buying behavior. And then to some extent can reduce the market

counterfeiting behaviors. On the other hand, improving fake goods producers’

manufacturing cost through social supervision and intensifying law enforcement can

reduce the flow of fake goods in the market. In addition, strengthening the publicity of

the product quality inspection and product information can provide certain guidance and

constraint to consumers, which also can reduce the counterfeiting behaviors.

Keywords：Counterfeiting behavior，Regulation，system，game analysis

摘要

ABSTRACT

第一章绪论 ...................................................... 1

1.1 选题背景及其意义 ............................................... 1

1.1.1 选题来源 ................................................... 1

1.1.2 选题背景 ................................................... 1

1.1.3 选题意义 ................................................... 1

1.2 国内外研究现状 ................................................. 2

1.2.1 国外研究现状 ............................................... 2

1.2.2 国内研究现状 ............................................... 3

1.2.3 文献总结 ................................................... 6

1.3 研究思路与基本框架 ............................................. 6

第二章相关理论研究 ................................................ 8

2.1 信息经济学理论 ................................................. 8

2.2 寻租理论 ....................................................... 8

2.3 行为经济学理论 ................................................ 10

2.4 交易费用理论 .................................................. 11

2.5 博弈理论 ...................................................... 13

2.5.1 博弈理论概述 .............................................. 13

2.5.2 演化博弈理论 .............................................. 13

第三章我国假冒伪劣现象存在的原因分析 ............................. 15

3.1 企业造假制假的原因分析 ........................................ 15

3.1.1 企业可通过寻租或侵权行为获得收益 .......................... 15

3.1.2 源于企业的机会主义行为 .................................... 16

3.1.3 源于某些企业的风险偏好 .................................... 18

3.2 消费者购假行为分析 ............................................ 18

3.2.1 不知情买假 ................................................ 19

3.2.2 知假自愿买假 .............................................. 19

3.2.3 知假被迫买假 .............................................. 19

3.3 监管制度角度分析 .............................................. 20

3.3.1 政府职能部门运行体制不健全 ................................ 20

3.3.2 社会监管力量的缺失 ........................................ 21

第四章企业制假行为的博弈分析 ..................................... 22

4.1 制造商和消费者之间的博弈分析 .................................. 22

4.1.1 制造商与消费者的完全信息静态博弈 .......................... 22

4.1.2 无限重复博弈过程 .......................................... 24

4.1.3 演化博弈过程 .............................................. 26

4.1.4 不完全信息博弈过程 ........................................ 28

4.2 正品企业生产商和假品企业生产商之间的博弈分析 .................. 29

4.2.1 完全信息动态博弈过程 ...................................... 29

4.2.2 完全不完美信息的博弈过程 .................................. 30

4.3 企业生产商和监督机构之间的博弈分析 ............................ 32

4.3.1 完全信息的静态博弈过程 .................................... 32

4.3.2 演化博弈过程 .............................................. 34

第五章总结与展望 ................................................. 37

5.1 本文总结 ...................................................... 37

5.1.1 降低正品的销售价格和提高假品生产商的造假成本 .............. 37

5.1.2 建立健全法律法规，提高制假造假行为的法律成本 .............. 37

5.1.3 加强产品质量检查和信息公开制度 ............................ 38

5.1.4 对消费者的行为进行道德约束 ................................ 38

5.2 本文展望 ...................................................... 39

5.2.1 本文研究的局限性 .......................................... 39

5.2.1 本文展望 .................................................. 39

参考文献 ........................................................... 40

在读期间公开发表的论文和承担科研项目及取得成果 ..................... 44

致谢 ............................................................. 45

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摘要：

摘要自从我国施行从计划经济到以市场经济为主导的经济改革体制以来，我国的经济水平获得了快速的发展，人们的生活水平得到了很大的提高；但是，随着经济水平和科技水平的增长，市场上制假售假现象也随之出现，并出现了快速的蔓延，涉及到了人们生活的方方面面。制假售假现象不仅侵犯了合法经营的企业的正当权益，损害了消费者的利益；破坏了正常的市场经济秩序，扰乱了我国市场经济的健康发展，而且破坏了社会的公平公正，对合法经营者的社会生产带来很大的危害。本文的重点是探究企业产品制假行为对我国企业以及消费者产生的影响。论文从当前我国市场经济情况出发，首先指出了在当前我国经济快速发展的过程中，制假售假不断出现这一现象，列出制...

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