管理层变动与企业绩效研究——来自中小板的数据

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摘要

现代企业制度下，委托代理关系必然会出现代理问题，即高级管理人员与股

东目标的不一致。为了达到两者目标一致性，会有一套公司治理机制来协调两者

之间的利益，会产生解聘原高级管理人员并聘任新管理人员的行为。那么高级管

理人员的变动是否会促进企业绩效也就成为研究的课题。有的学者经过研究认为，

高级管理人员的变动会促进企业绩效的提高，然而另有学者经过研究认为，高级

管理人员的变动并不会改善绩效，也许还会出现绩效下滑。

本文以中小板 201 家非金融上市企业为样本，分为 PE 支持和非 PE 支持企业

分别进行研究，并且对两类样本之间管理层变动与企业绩效的关系进行了比较。

本文在实证研究部分采用了描述性统计、相关性分析和回归分析方法。本文的研

究主要得出以下结论：

一、PE 支持企业管理层变动率略低于非 PE 支持企业，但是两者差异很小。

二、对非 PE 支持企业的研究表明：

董事会进入率与企业绩效表现出了正相关性，但是不显著；

董事会退出率与企业绩效呈现出了显著的负相关性；

监事会进入率与企业绩效变现出了正相关性，但是不显著；

监事会退出率与企业绩效表现出了负相关性，但是只与 EPSCUT 显著；

经理层进入率与企业绩效表现出了正相关性，但是只在 10%的水平上与

EPSCUT 正相关，而与销售净利率无显著性；

经理层退出率与企业绩效负相关，但是只与销售净利率显著；

内部职务变动率与企业绩效正相关，但是只与销售净利率显著；

内部职务交叉变动率与企业绩效的关系不明确，不同的模型得出不同的结论。

三、对 PE 支持企业的研究表明：

监事会进入率、经理层退出率、内部职务交叉变动率对企业绩效的影响方向

不确定，其中，只有内部职务交叉变动率与销售净利率的表现出了显著性；

董事会进入率与企业绩效负相关，但无显著性；

董事会退出率、监事会退出率、经理层进入率、内部职务变动率与企业绩效

正相关，但无显著性；

总体上来看，PE 支持企业，管理层变动对企业绩效无明显的影响。

四、PE 支持企业不一定能够提高企业绩效。通过比较研究发现，非 PE 支持

企业，在管理层变动方面，对绩效的影响更大。

关键词：管理层变动私募股权投资基金绩效中小板

ABSTRACT

Problems will be bound to arise in the principal-agent relationship under modern

corporate system. That's to say, senior executives and shareholders may aim differently.

In order for the two sides to have the same goal, corporate governance will coordinate

their interests, thus the original senior executives may get fired and new administrators

may be employed. Then whether the modification of senior executives will benefit the

corporate performance becomes a topic. Some scholars through research propose that

the modification will promote the corporate performance while some others think it will

not, and it may even have a negative influence on the corporate performance.

The paper takes 201 medium and small-sized non-financial companies (PE backed

as well as none PE backed) as samples to do research, and makes a comparison between

the modification of administrators and corporate performance. The paper uses

descriptive statistics, correlation analysis and regression analysis as methods in the

empirical study part. The conclusions are as the following:

There's less change in the administrators in PE backed companies than in none PE

backed companies, but the difference is tiny.

The research on the none PE backed companies shows that:

Board access rate and corporate performance are positively correlative, but it's not

significant.

Board exit rate and corporate performance have significant negative correlation.

Supervisor access rate and corporate performance are somewhat positively

correlated.

Supervisors exit rate and corporate performance are negatively correlative, but it's

only significant with EPSCUT.

Manager access rate is positively correlative with corporate performance, but it's

only 10% positively correlative with EPSCUT, and not significant with sales net profit

rate.

Manager exit rate and corporate performance have negative correlation, but only

significant with sales net profit rate.

Internal job change rate is positively correlated with corporate performance, but

only significant with sales net profit rate.

The relationship between internal job cross change rate and corporate performance

is not obvious. The conclusions vary in certain situations.

III

The research on the PE backed companies shows that:

The influences from Supervisor access rate, manager exit rate and internal job

cross change rate on corporate performance are uncertain, among which only internal

job cross change rate and sales net profit rate have significant relationship.

Board access rate and corporate performance have non-significant negative

correlation.

Board exit rate, supervisors exit rate, manager access rate and internal job change

rate are positively correlated with corporate performance, but it's not significant.

Generally, the change of administrators doesn't affect corporate performance much

in PE backed companies.

It's hard to say whether PE backed companies can promote corporate performance.

The conclusion through research is that the change of administrators affect corporate

performance more in none PE backed companies.

Key Word: management turnover, private equity, performance,

medium and small-sized

中文摘要

ABSTRACT

第一章绪论 ............................................................................................................... 1

1.1 研究背景 ............................................................................................................. 1

1.2 研究意义 ............................................................................................................. 1

1.3 研究方法 ............................................................................................................. 3

1.4 论文结构 ............................................................................................................. 3

1.5 本文创新与不足 ................................................................................................. 5

1.5.1 本文创新 ....................................................................................................... 5

1.5.2 本文不足 ....................................................................................................... 5

第二章文献综述 ......................................................................................................... 7

2.1 国内文献综述 ..................................................................................................... 7

2.1.1 董事会变动与企业绩效 ............................................................................... 7

2.1.2 经理层变动与企业绩效 ............................................................................... 8

2.1.3 私募股权投资与企业绩效 ........................................................................... 8

2.2 国外文献综述 ..................................................................................................... 9

2.2.1 董事会变动与企业绩效 ............................................................................... 9

2.2.2 经理层变动与企业绩效 ............................................................................. 10

2.2.3 私募股权投资与企业绩效 ......................................................................... 11

第三章理论基础 ....................................................................................................... 13

3.1 委托代理理论 ................................................................................................... 13

3.2 公司治理理论 ................................................................................................... 15

3.2.1 内部治理模式 ............................................................................................. 16

3.2.2 外部治理模式 ............................................................................................. 17

3.3 现代管家理论 ................................................................................................... 18

3.4 冲突理论 ........................................................................................................... 20

3.5 人力资本理论 ................................................................................................... 22

第四章实证分析 ....................................................................................................... 25

4.1 概念界定 ........................................................................................................... 25

4.2 样本选取与数据来源 ....................................................................................... 25

4.3 变量定义 ........................................................................................................... 25

4.3.1 被解释变量 ................................................................................................. 25

4.3.2 解释变量 ..................................................................................................... 26

4.3.3 控制变量 ..................................................................................................... 26

4.4 非PE 支持企业的管理层变动与企业绩效 .................................................... 27

4.4.1 研究模型 ..................................................................................................... 27

4.4.2 研究假设 ..................................................................................................... 28

4.4.3 描述性统计与相关性分析 ......................................................................... 29

4.4.4 回归分析 ..................................................................................................... 30

4.4.5 研究结论 ..................................................................................................... 31

4.5 PE 支持企业的管理层变动与企业绩效 ......................................................... 32

4.5.1 研究模型 ..................................................................................................... 32

4.5.2 研究假设 ..................................................................................................... 32

4.5.3 描述性统计 ................................................................................................. 33

4.5.4 回归分析 ..................................................................................................... 34

4.5.5 研究结论 ..................................................................................................... 35

4.6 非PE 支持企业与 PE 支持企业的比较研究 .................................................. 35

第五章政策性建议与研究展望 ............................................................................... 36

5.1 政策性建议 ....................................................................................................... 36

5.2 研究展望 ........................................................................................................... 38

参考文献 ..................................................................................................................... 41

致谢 ........................................................................................................................... 46

在读期间公开发表的论文和承担科研项目及取得成果 ......................................... 47

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摘要：

I摘要现代企业制度下，委托代理关系必然会出现代理问题，即高级管理人员与股东目标的不一致。为了达到两者目标一致性，会有一套公司治理机制来协调两者之间的利益，会产生解聘原高级管理人员并聘任新管理人员的行为。那么高级管理人员的变动是否会促进企业绩效也就成为研究的课题。有的学者经过研究认为，高级管理人员的变动会促进企业绩效的提高，然而另有学者经过研究认为，高级管理人员的变动并不会改善绩效，也许还会出现绩效下滑。本文以中小板201家非金融上市企业为样本，分为PE支持和非PE支持企业分别进行研究，并且对两类样本之间管理层变动与企业绩效的关系进行了比较。本文在实证研究部分采用了描述性统计、相关性分析和回归分...

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