家族企业控制权与企业绩效—基于中国家族上市公司实证研

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摘要

随着全球化的不断推进，公司控制权理论研究已经成为了众多学者的一个研

究热点。而公司控制权结构的核心问题是提高企业的决策科学性和提高企业的绩

效。公司绩效是公司治理水平的高低和治理结构的健全与否的最直接和最有效的

反映。可以这么说，有效的公司控制权结构是公司绩效良好的必要条件。国内外

的很多学者已经对控制权结构和公司绩效的关系做出了一些良好的探索。

家族上市公司与一般的公众公司相对比，在股权结构，董事会结构有着明显

的差异。综观国内外的文献，单独把作为特殊群体的家族上市企业拿来当研究对

象得还不多见。董事会结构和股权结构对企业绩效是否存在影响一直是各国学者

专业以及各个公司治理机构研究的热点，但针对上市家族企业的专门研究并不多，

本文对家族企业的控制权结构和企业绩效的关系的研究，在理论方面和实践方面

都有着重大的意义。

围绕这一问题，本文选取了中国上市家族企业中的324个样本公司，之所以选

择上市家族企业为研究对象，是因为家族上市公司的信息披露程度远比非上市的

家族企业要高，而更为重要的是我国目前家族上市公司所呈现出的代理问题非常

明显。本文对样本公司的董事会结构和股权结构与企业绩效的关系进行了实证研

究。

在研究方法上本文采取了规范研究和实证研究相结合的方法，在规范研究中，

本文根据前人的研究成果，以及已有的相关理论梳理出来了本文的主要研究逻辑

路线，运用家族企业的两类代理问题，然后再运用相关的数学模型进行推理假设。

在实证研究中，本文选取2009年底324家家族上市公司的财务数据和公司治理数据，

设计了两个应变量为托宾Q值和主营业务利润率，自变量分为两大类为股权结构变

量和董事会结构变量，其中股权结构选取了家族持股比例即家族现金流权，家族

控制权（投票权），现金流权和控制权分离系数，第二大股东到第十大股东持股

比例之和。董事会结构选取了董事会规模，独立董事比例，董事长总经理两职兼

任，实际控制人是否担任公司董事长或总经理，前三名高管薪酬总和，董事长和

总经理持股比例为变量。通过SPSS17.0对截面数据进行描述性统计，相关性分析，

多元线性回归分析，稳健性分析等统计方法，对家族上市公司进行实证分析。得

出了以下结论：

1．控制性家族对家族企业的控制权与现金流权与企业绩效呈正向相关，表明

了控制家族与企业的利益趋向于一致。另一方面，控制性家族持有的所有权与控

制权越大，就越有动力去管理以及监督公司管理层，积极参与公司决策。而第二

大到第十大股东的持股比例与企业绩效不呈显著相关关系，说明中小股东由于存

在着监督成本，便产生了搭便车效应。增强股东的监督动力和能力的方法就是需

要提高其持股比例，这样更能保护好公司和股东的权益。

董事长持股比例与上市家族企业绩效之间显著负相关。导致这个情况的原因

可能是，家族企业中的董事长常常会是家族企业的实际控制人，他的控股比例越

高，其他股东的利益就越有可能受到侵害，董事会中其他董事的制约作用就会减

弱。总经理持股比例与各项业绩指标之间都没有显著关系，说明现阶段我国家族

上市公司总经理的股权激励力度不强，这可能是家族企业的特性封闭性导致的。

2．实证研究中，董事会规模与独立董事比例与企业绩效均呈不相关关系。这

说明我国家族上市企业董事会在家族的控制下，往往变成一言堂，董事会难以发

挥出应有的作用，而独立董事的作用总体还不明显，很多都是为了应付证监会的

规定而设置的，没有发挥它应有的职能。

3．高管前三名薪酬总额与企业绩效有显著的正相关关系。这说明对于高管薪

酬激励的效果是明显的，这也很好解决了所有者和管理者的代理问题，使高管更

加有动力去创造了公司的财富，对提升公司绩效有积极的影响。

实证研究的结果表明我国目前家族上市公司中的两类代理问题比较明显，控

制权各个要素与企业绩效之间的有比较显著的关系，总的来说家族企业发展得机

遇与风险并存，公司治理机制有待完善，相关的监管部门政策制定部门要进一步

优化市场加强建设，为我国家族企业的发展提供良好的环境。

关键词：家族上市公司控制权实证研究公司绩效

ABSTRACT

With economic globalization and the increasing rise of equity doctrine, corporate

control structure has become an important theoretical research. Control of the

company's core structure is to ensure that corporate decision-making scientific and

increase company performance. The level of company performance and sound corporate

governance is whether the most effective and most direct reflection of the inevitable

high standards of corporate governance and good corporate performance and sustainable

development capacity linked. It can be said that effective control of the company

structure is a necessary condition for improving corporate performance. Many scholars

at home and abroad have researched the relationship between control right structure and

performance have made useful exploration.

By comparing between public family firms and common public firms, there are

many differences in many aspects, Such as ownership structure and business

environment. Looking at the literature at home and abroad, view a solo group of the

family as a special listing of companies as an object of study is unusual. Board structure

and ownership structure on corporate performance has been the existence of specialized

scholars from various countries and various institutions of corporate governance

research focus. But for the family business specializing in public is not much. This

control structure of listed companies and corporate performance relationship has

important theoretical and practical significance

Around this problem, we selected the family of Chinese listed companies in the

sample of 324 companies. Listed family firms was chosen as the research object,

because the family level of information disclosure of listed companies than non-listed

family business must be high, but more important is that China's current family of listed

companies showed the agency problem is obvious.

The approach of this study adopted a standardized research of combining with

empirical research. In the standardized study, this article according to previous research,

and related theories sorted out the logic of the main research line of this article, use two

types of agency problems of family business, and the mathematical model to derive

related assumptions. In the empirical study, this article selected 324 family firms’ the

end of 2009 financial data of listed companies and corporate governance data, the

design of the two values of the dependent variable is Tobin's Q and the OPE.

Independent variables divided into two categories for the ownership structure and board

structure variable. Select the family ownership structure in which the proportion of the

family holding cash flow rights, family control rights (voting rights), cash flow rights

and control over the separation factor, the second largest shareholder to the tenth largest

and the shareholding ratio. Board Structure Board size selected the proportion of

independent directors, the chairman, general manager of two jobs concurrently, whether

the actual control as the company chairman or general manager, pay the sum of the top

three executives, chairman and general manager of shareholding ratio variable. Select

data by SPSS17.0 of descriptive statistics, correlation analysis, multiple linear

regression analysis, robustness analysis, statistical method, empirical analysis of the

family of listed companies. Reached the following conclusions:

1. The control right and cash flow rights is positively associated with firm

performance. That manifest the controlling family and business interests tend to the

same. In order to obtain long-term returns , the greater family ownership and control

held by, they have the greater incentive to management and supervisory management,

concerned about their market performance and operations, and actively participate in

corporate decision-making,. And second to the tenth largest shareholder's ownership

percentage and corporate performance is not significantly correlated. That due to the

dominance of the back, the other minority shareholders by the existence of monitoring

costs, they have a free-rider effect, the shareholders of the company managers lack of

oversight power and ability, but poor management in the company out of the situation in

the dissemination of information select to sell stocks. Enhance the ability of

shareholders to monitor power and the method is the need to increase its stake, the

company's internal control and governance more perfect to reduce the tunnel effect,

better protect the interests of the company and shareholders

Chairman shareholding ratio is negatively correlated with firm performance.

General Manager of shareholding ratio showed no correlation between corporate

performance. The result may be due to this situation, the family enterprise is often a

family business, chairman of the actual controller, the higher the proportion of his

holding, the more the interests of other shareholders may have been violated, the board

of directors of other constraints in the role of will be weakened, chairman of the board

have the final say of all things, leading to scientific decision-making, which affect

performance. At this stage, general manager of the family listed equity incentive

intensity is not strong, this may be the characteristics of family businesses closed due to,

in general, the proportion of China's current general manager of holding general are still

relatively low.

2. Board size and proportion of independent directors showed no correlation with

corporate performance. This shows that our family of listed companies under the control

of the board in the family, often turned into one-man, the board is difficult to play its

due role, and the overall role of independent directors is not obvious, many of which are

in order to meet the requirements of the Commission set up, did not play its proper

functions.

3. Total remuneration of the top three executives and corporate performance have a

significant positive correlation. This shows that the effects of incentive pay for

executives is obvious, this also solved the problem of agency owners and managers to

make executives more incentive to create the company's wealth, to enhance corporate

performance have a positive effect.

Empirical results show that the family of listed companies in China currently two

types of agency problems in the more obvious control over the elements and business

performance are among the more significant relationship, the whole family businesses

develop opportunities and risks, corporate governance mechanisms need to be improved,

the relevant regulatory policy-making departments to further optimize the market to

strengthen the construction and development of family enterprises in China provide a

good environment.

Key Word：Public Family Firm, Control Right, Empirical Study,

Corporate Performance

中文摘要

ABSTRACT

第一章绪论 ......................................................... 1

§1.1 研究背景 ..................................................... 1

§1.2 研究对象 ..................................................... 2

§1.3 研究内容和方法 ............................................... 3

§1.4 研究的意义 ................................................... 5

§1.5 研究的创新之处 ............................................... 5

第二章相关理论综述与评析 ........................................... 7

§2.1 家族企业以及家族上市公司的界定 .............................. 7

§2.1.1 家族企业的主流看法 ....................................... 7

§2.1.2 家族上市公司的界定 ...................................... 8

§2.1.3 我国上市家族公司研究现状 ................................. 9

§2.2 家族企业控制权 .............................................. 10

§2.2.1 家族企业控制权定义 ...................................... 10

§2.3 控制权与企业绩效的关系 ...................................... 12

§2.3.1 股权结构与企业绩效的关系 ................................ 12

§2.3.2 董事会结构与企业绩效的关系 .............................. 14

第三章家族企业的两类委托代理问题 .................................. 17

§3.1 家族企业与职业经理人之间的代理问题 .......................... 17

§3.1.1 控制权转移的障碍 ........................................ 17

§3.1.2 外部市场与法律监管 ...................................... 18

§3.1.3 家族影响 ............................................... 19

§3.2 家族控股股东与中小股东的代理问题 ............................ 20

§3.2.1 第二类代理问题的产生 .................................... 20

§3.2.2 金字塔控股结构 .......................................... 21

§3.2.3 利益侵占代理问题—隧道行为 .............................. 23

§3.3 本章小结 .................................................... 24

第四章家族企业控制权与企业绩效的相关性分析 ........................ 26

§4.1 股权结构和绩效的关系 ........................................ 26

§4.2 董事会结构与企业绩效的关系 .................................. 28

第五章家族企业控制权与企业绩效实证研究设计 ........................ 32

§5.1 样本选择和数据来源 .......................................... 32

§5.2 变量设计 .................................................... 32

§5.2.1 因变量 .................................................. 32

§5.2.2 自变量 .................................................. 33

§5.2.3 控制变量 ................................................ 34

第六章家族企业控制权与企业绩效实证结果与分析 ...................... 35

§6.1 描述性统计 .................................................. 35

§6.2 相关性分析 .................................................. 37

§6.3 多元线性回归分析 ............................................ 40

§6.4 稳健性分析 .................................................. 46

第七章结论与政策建议 .............................................. 48

§7.1 结论 ........................................................ 48

§7.2 政策建议 .................................................... 49

参考文献 ........................................................... 52

在读期间公开发表的论文和承担科研项目及取得成果 ..................... 58

致谢 ............................................................... 59

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摘要：

摘要随着全球化的不断推进，公司控制权理论研究已经成为了众多学者的一个研究热点。而公司控制权结构的核心问题是提高企业的决策科学性和提高企业的绩效。公司绩效是公司治理水平的高低和治理结构的健全与否的最直接和最有效的反映。可以这么说，有效的公司控制权结构是公司绩效良好的必要条件。国内外的很多学者已经对控制权结构和公司绩效的关系做出了一些良好的探索。家族上市公司与一般的公众公司相对比，在股权结构，董事会结构有着明显的差异。综观国内外的文献，单独把作为特殊群体的家族上市企业拿来当研究对象得还不多见。董事会结构和股权结构对企业绩效是否存在影响一直是各国学者专业以及各个公司治理机构研究的热点，但针对上市家族...

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