税收遵从的理论研究及其在税收管理中的应用

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摘要

如何提高纳税人的税收遵从程度是一道困绕着世界各国政府的难题，为了揭

开税收遵从之谜，学者们进行了大量艰苦卓绝而富有创造性的研究。然而迄今为

止，人们并不能令人满意地解释税收遵从行为，本文以博弈论、信息经济学、新

制度经济学、犯罪经济学、财政学等为主要理论基础对税收遵从进行了一个较为

系统的研究。

本文的主要研究内容如下：

1 纳税人与税务机关之间的博弈分析

本文分别从经典博弈论和进化博弈论的角度分析了纳税人与税务机关之间的

博弈。结果显示税务审计以及对税收不遵从行为的惩罚是提高税收遵从的有效政

策工具。在税款的征收过程中，大额逃税的纳税人少，小额逃税的纳税人多。以

进化博弈论为主要工具分析了税务机关和纳税人之间的博弈的动态演化过程，结

果表明税收遵从具有鲜明的路径依赖与周期性特征。

在上述分析的基础上，对提高税收遵从的政策进行了一些讨论。其一，出于

成本收益的考虑，消除逃税目标应该设置在使消除逃税所带来的边际收益与消除

逃税所产生的边际成本相等时为止。其二，为使惩罚有效，对税收不遵从行为的

惩罚，必须保持一个合理的边际威慑。其三，内生性审计与随机审计相结合的方

式可以更有效地提高税收遵从程度。

2 关于税收刑事威慑的研究

首先分析了威慑与税收遵从的关系以及税收刑事威慑的局限性。其一，刑事

处罚会在相当程度上降低制裁实施的速度。其二，对违反税法者进行定罪非常困

难。其三，与其它惩罚形式相比，刑事惩罚耗费了大量的社会资源。

然后分析了税收刑事威慑高度有效的条件。它要求有较高的查获率和较高的

定罪率。尽管面临刑事威慑，由于违法者的风险偏好特性，没有足够高的查获率，

刑事威慑对于提高税收遵从程度不会有显著的效果。

最后分析了中国的税收刑事政策未能取得良好的威慑效果的原因。一是由于

缺乏统一而明确的起诉政策。二是由于缺乏相关的人力资产。三是由于制度上的

缺陷。

3 关于税收道德的研究

首先对税收道德与税收遵从的关系进行了研究，结果表明税收道德与税收遵

从之间存在着显著的正相关关系。

然后从关系契约的角度出发对税收道德的影响因素进行了分析。结果表明第

一，腐败，尤其是司法腐败将严重损害公民的税收道德，随着严重犯罪的增加，

公民的税收道德也随之下降。第二，如果税务机关以一种官僚主义的方式对待纳

税人，纳税人将产生一种失望的感觉，进而觉得他们没有被税务机关认真地对待。

于是纳税人自愿支付税款的意愿将下降。反之，如果税务机关以尊重的方式对待

纳税人，这将可以提高纳税人的税收道德水平。第三，一个非线性结构的处罚结

构有助于纳税人税收道德的形成。第四，纳税人在做出是否遵从税法的决策时是

相互依赖、相互影响的。

最后用单因素方差分析研究了性别、年龄、婚姻状况、收入水平、教育程度

与税收道德的关系。结果显示性别、年龄及婚姻状况对税收道德有显著影响，而

收入水平和接受教育的程度对公民的税收道德没有显著影响。

4 关于不对称信息与税收遵从的研究

(1) 税务机关与纳税人之间的信息不对称问题

首先研究了征纳双方的信息不对称造成的影响。第一，造成了纳税人的逆向

选择。第二，造成了税制的扭曲。第三，加大了税收的征收成本。其次，研究了

减少纳税人与税务机关之间的信息不对称的政策。一是限制现金交易。二是严格

发票管理。三是建立以税务机关为主导的社会化税源监控系统。最后，对在信息

不对称条件下如何激励纳税人诚实纳税进行了研究。结果显示纳税人与相关主体

间的关联博弈和重复博弈加大了对不诚实的纳税人的惩罚力度，从而可以极大地

激励纳税人选择诚实纳税。

(2) 税务机关间的交易成本与契约选择

首先对上下税务机关之间出现交易成本的原因进行了研究。研究表明上下级

税务机关之间的信息不对称、上下级税务机关之间的效用函数不一致以及下级税

务机关的机会主义行为是导致上下级税务机关之间出现了高昂的交易成本的根本

原因。然后对几种税收契约进行了比较研究。结果显示能显著降低交易成本的税

收计划契约是在目前条件下税务机关能做的一个理性选择。

本文的主要创新点如下：

(1) 以进化博弈论为主要工具分析了税务机关和纳税人之间的博弈的动态演

化过程，结果表明税收遵从具有鲜明的路径依赖与周期性特征

(2) 阐明了威慑与税收遵从的关系以及税收刑事威慑的局限性，指出税收刑事

威慑并不一定必然能提高税收遵从程度，给出了税收刑事政策高度有效的条件

(3) 初步阐明了税收道德的影响因素

首先从关系契约的角度出发对税收道德的影响因素进行了分析。本文以 OECD

成员国中的 17 个国家为样本进行了研究，得出了两个重要结论。第一，政府愈是

廉洁，公民的税收道德水平愈高。第二，一个国家的严重犯罪愈少，公民的税收

III

道德水平愈高。

最后用单因素方差分析法分析了性别、年龄、婚姻状况、收入水平、教育程

度与税收道德的关系。结果显示性别、年龄及婚姻状况对税收道德有显著影响，

而收入水平和接受教育的程度对公民的税收道德没有显著影响。

(4) 关于不对称信息与税收遵从的研究

本文首先指出征纳双方之间信息不对称造成的后果之一是纳税人的逆向选

择，即诚实的纳税人在竞争中被不断地逐出市场，阐明了产生这一后果的机理。

指出纳税人与相关主体的重复博弈和关联博弈可以有效地驱使纳税人诚实纳税。

然后分析了上下级税务机关之间出现交易成本的原因。并对固定工资契约、

分成契约以及税收计划契约进行了比较研究。结果显示能显著降低交易成本的税

收计划契约是在目前条件下税务机关能做的一个理性选择。

关键词：税收遵从威慑博弈税收道德信息不对称

本文的研究得到国家自然科学基金项目(70371070)资助。

ABSTRACT

How to effectively promote tax compliance is a difficult problem which all

countries confront with. In order to reveal riddle of tax compliance, lots of hardy,

creative researches have been done. But we can not still explain tax compliance

behavior satisfactorily. A comparatively systemic research was done in the dissertation

on the basis of Game Theory, Information Economics, New Institutional Economics,

Crime Economics, and Finance.

The primary content of the dissertation is as follows:

Section 1 is an analysis of game between taxpayers and tax authorities

The Section analyzes the game between taxpayers and tax authorities from the

perspective of classical game theory and evolutionary game theory, respectively. The

results indicate that tax audit and fine are effective measures for facilitating tax

compliance, and the tax evaders who evade large amount of tax is relatively less, the tax

evaders who evade small amount of tax is relatively more. The dynamic evolutionary

process of game between tax authorities and tax-payers was also analyzed in the Section.

The results show that the process of evolution presents the characteristics of periodicity

and path dependence.

On the basis of foregoing analysis, the policy for improving tax compliance was

discussed. Firstly, the objective of reducing tax evasion should be placed the point

where the marginal return eliminating tax evasion produces is equal to its marginal cost.

Secondly, to make punishment effective, the structure of punishment for tax

noncompliance should be nonlinear. Lastly, the combination of endogenous audit rules

and random audit rules can generate substantially more compliance than an endogenous

audit rules or random audit rules alone.

Section 2 is on tax criminal deterrence

The relationship between deterrence and tax compliance and the limits of criminal

deterrence were firstly analyzed. The main limits of tax criminal deterrence is that

criminal punishment slower greatly the speed of sanction, that it is also greatly difficult

to convict the taxpayers who offend tax law of sin, and that criminal punishment

expends plentiful resources when compared with other forms of punishment.

Secondly, the conditions which the effective criminal deterrence should have were

pointed out in the section. It requires a high detection probability and conviction

probability. Criminal deterrence can not achieve significant effect in absence of high

probability of detection, because of the nature of risk-seeking the people who offend

law usually have.

Finally, the section points out that it is because of lack of uniform and clear policy

for prosecution, pertinent human asset and disadvantages of institution that China’s tax

criminal policy can not achieve favorable deterrent effect.

Section 3 is a study on tax morale

The relationship between tax morale and tax compliance was firstly studied. The

results show that tax morale has significant, positive effect on tax compliance.

Secondly, the determinants of tax morale were analyzed from the perspective of

relation contract. The results indicate that corruption, especially judicial corruption

undermines tax morale badly, that tax morale decrease with the increase of the number

of serious crimes, that the taxpayer’s tax morale fall if they were bureaucratically

treated by tax authorities and tax morale increase if they were respectfully treated by tax

authorities, that a structure of nonlinear punishment is conducive to the emergence of

tax morale, that the taxpayers strongly depend on each other when they make decision

to comply with tax law or not to.

Lastly, the relationship between gender, age, martial status, income, and education

level and tax morale were analyzed through one-way analysis of variance, respectively.

The results show that the gender, age and martial status of citizens have significant

effect on tax morale, but the income level and education level have not significant effect

on tax morale.

Section 4 is a study on asymmetric information and tax compliance

The section consists of two parts. Part 1 concentrates on symmetric information

between taxpayers and the tax authority. The part firstly analyzes the influence which

asymmetric information between taxpayers and the tax authorities produces. It results in

adverse selection, distortion of the tax system and increase of tax collection cost.

Secondly, the policy tools for decreasing asymmetric information between taxpayers

and the tax authorities were put forward. Lastly, the section points out that associated

game and repeated game can greatly propel the taxpayers to pay taxes honestly.

Part 2 discusses the transaction cost between higher and lower tax authorities and

tax contract choice. The causes of emergence of transaction costs between higher and

lower tax authorities were firstly analyzed in the part. Owing to information asymmetry,

the conflict of utility function and opportunism, the transaction costs between higher

and lower tax authorities come into being. At the same time, a comparative study

between fixed wage contract, share contract and revenue task contract was done in the

part and comes to the conclusion that revenue task contract is a rational choice at

present because the contract can effectively save transaction costs.

The dissertation’s primary innovations are as follows:

(1) The dynamic evolutionary process of game between tax authorities and

tax-payers was analyzed in the dissertation, based on evolutionary game theory.

The results show that the process of evolution presents the characteristics of

periodicity and path dependence.

(2) The dissertation analyzed that the relationship between deterrence and tax

compliance and the limits of criminal deterrence, and points out that tax criminal

deterrence can not always promote tax compliance. At the same time, the

conditions which the effective criminal deterrence should have were pointed out in

the dissertation.

(3) An elementary analysis on the determinants of tax morale

The determinants of tax morale were analyzed from the perspective of relation

contract, based on data from OECD countries. The results indicate that corruption

undermines tax morale badly, and that tax morale decrease with the increase of the

number of serious crimes.

The relationship between gender, age, martial status, income, and education level

and tax morale were analyzed through one-way analysis of variance, respectively. The

results show that the gender, age and martial status of citizens have significant effect on

tax morale, but the income level and education level have not significant effect on tax

morale.

(4) A study on asymmetric information and tax compliance

The dissertation firstly points out symmetric information between taxpayers and

the tax authority result in taxpayers’ adverse selection. The mechanism of taxpayers’

adverse selection was illustrated. At the same time, the dissertation points out that

associated game and repeated game can greatly propel the taxpayers to pay taxes

honestly.

Secondly, the causes of emergence of transaction costs between higher and lower

tax authorities were analyzed. Furthermore, a comparative study between fixed wage

contract, share contract and revenue task contract was done in the part and comes to the

VII

conclusion that revenue task contract is a rational choice at present because the contract

can effectively save transaction costs.

Keywords: tax compliance, deterrence, game, tax morale,

information asymmetry

The research in the dissertation is financially supported by the item of National Nature

Science Foundation of China (No. 70371070).

VIII

摘要

ABSTRACT

第一章绪论.................................................................................................................. 1

1.1 本文的研究背景和意义 ........................................................................................ 1

1.1.1 研究背景 ......................................................................................................... 1

1.1.2 研究意义 ......................................................................................................... 3

1.2 本文的章节结构与主要内容 ................................................................................ 5

1.3 本文的主要创新点 ................................................................................................ 6

1.4 本文研究的基本思路与方法 ................................................................................ 8

1.5 本文中的几个重要概念 ........................................................................................ 8

第二章税收遵从研究现状述评 .................................................................................. 10

2.1 国外研究现状述评 .............................................................................................. 10

2.1.1 逃税模型 ....................................................................................................... 10

2.1.2 税收道德和道义劝告 ................................................................................... 17

2.1.3 预扣税款现象 ............................................................................................... 19

2.1.4 公平 ............................................................................................................... 20

2.1.5 纳税人态度调查 ........................................................................................... 21

2.1.6 其它研究 ....................................................................................................... 23

2.2 国内研究现状述评 .............................................................................................. 25

2.3 本章小结 .............................................................................................................. 26

第三章纳税人与税务机关之间的博弈分析 .............................................................. 27

3.1 纳税人与税务机关之间的博弈：一个经典博弈论的视角 .............................. 27

3.2 纳税人与税务机关之间的博弈：一个进化博弈论的视角 .............................. 31

3.2.1 进化博弈相关理论 ....................................................................................... 31

3.2.2 纳税人与税务机关之间的进化博弈模型 ................................................... 33

3.3 关于以上两个模型的进一步讨论 ...................................................................... 39

3.3.1 经典博弈论和进化博弈论是相互补充的 ................................................... 39

3.3.2 审计和惩罚是提高税收遵从的有效政策工具 ........................................... 40

3.3.3 大额逃税的纳税人少，小额逃税的纳税人多 ........................................... 40

3.3.4 税收遵从行为呈现出路径依赖与周期性特征 ........................................... 41

3.4 对提高税收遵从的政策的初步讨论 .................................................................. 41

3.4.1 是否要消除所有的逃税行为 ....................................................................... 41

3.4.2 如何实施惩罚 ............................................................................................... 42

3.4.3 如何实施税务审计 ....................................................................................... 43

3.5 本章小结 .............................................................................................................. 44

第四章税收刑事威慑与税收遵从 .............................................................................. 46

4.1 引言 ...................................................................................................................... 46

4.2 威慑与税收遵从 .................................................................................................. 47

4.2.1 威慑与税收遵从的关系 ............................................................................... 47

4 .2.2 税收刑事威慑的局限性 .............................................................................. 50

4.3 税收刑事威慑高度有效的条件 .......................................................................... 52

4.3.1 有较高的查获率 ........................................................................................... 52

4.3.2 案件一旦被起诉，有较高的定罪率 ........................................................... 53

4.4 中国税收刑事威慑效果不佳的主要原因 .......................................................... 54

4.4.1 缺乏统一而明确的起诉政策 ....................................................................... 54

4.4.2 缺乏相关的人力资产 ................................................................................... 55

4.4.3 制度上的缺陷 ............................................................................................... 56

4.5 完善我国税收刑事政策的对策与建议 .............................................................. 58

4.5.1 提高税务稽查人员及相关司法系统人员素质 ........................................... 58

4.5.2 合并国税和地税的稽查局，建立统一的稽查局 ....................................... 58

4.5.3 借鉴国际经验，建立符合中国国情的税务警察制度 ............................... 59

4.5.4 建立统一而明确的税收刑事案件起诉政策 ............................................... 60

4.6 本章小结 .............................................................................................................. 60

第五章税收道德与税收遵从 ...................................................................................... 62

5.1 引言 ...................................................................................................................... 62

5.2 税收道德与税收遵从的关系 .............................................................................. 64

5.3 影响税收道德的因素：一个关系契约的视角 .................................................. 67

5.3.1 司法腐败与安全 ........................................................................................... 67

5.3.2 税务机关对待纳税人的方式 ....................................................................... 71

5.3.3 威慑工具 ....................................................................................................... 71

5.3.4 纳税人之间的相互影响 ............................................................................... 72

5.4 影响税收道德的其它因素 .................................................................................. 73

5.4.1 单因素方差分析 ........................................................................................... 73

5.4.2 影响税收道德的其它因素的单因素方差分析 ........................................... 74

5.5 本章小结 .............................................................................................................. 83

第六章信息、激励与税收遵从 .................................................................................. 85

6.1 引言 ...................................................................................................................... 85

6.2 税务机关与纳税人之间的信息不对称 .............................................................. 86

6.2.1 税务机关与纳税人之间的信息不对称对税收造成的影响 ....................... 86

6.2.2 减少纳税人与税务机关之间的信息不对称的政策 ................................... 89

6.2.3 信息不对称条件下对纳税人的激励 ........................................................... 92

6.3 税务机关间交易成本与契约选择 ...................................................................... 94

6.3.1 税务机关之间出现交易成本的原因 ......................................................... 94

6.3.2 几种税收契约的比较 ................................................................................... 95

6.4 本章小结 ............................................................................................................ 104

第七章全文总结与展望 ............................................................................................ 105

7.1 本文研究工作的总结 ........................................................................................ 105

7.2 进一步研究工作的展望 .................................................................................... 108

参考文献 .......................................................................................................................110

在读期间公开发表的论文和承担科研项目及取得成果 .......................................... 120

致谢............................................................................................................................ 122

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摘要：

I摘要如何提高纳税人的税收遵从程度是一道困绕着世界各国政府的难题，为了揭开税收遵从之谜，学者们进行了大量艰苦卓绝而富有创造性的研究。然而迄今为止，人们并不能令人满意地解释税收遵从行为，本文以博弈论、信息经济学、新制度经济学、犯罪经济学、财政学等为主要理论基础对税收遵从进行了一个较为系统的研究。本文的主要研究内容如下：1纳税人与税务机关之间的博弈分析本文分别从经典博弈论和进化博弈论的角度分析了纳税人与税务机关之间的博弈。结果显示税务审计以及对税收不遵从行为的惩罚是提高税收遵从的有效政策工具。在税款的征收过程中，大额逃税的纳税人少，小额逃税的纳税人多。以进化博弈论为主要工具分析了税务机关和纳税人之...

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