金融机构与物流企业在存货质押业务中的激励研究

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3.0 周伟光 2024-09-20 4 4 475.68KB 58 页 150积分

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摘要

随着越来越多的中小企业通过存货质押运作获得了银行贷款，改善资金链。

同时，许多知名的物流企业和金融机构也因开展存货质押业务实现了新的利润增

长，存货质押在我国已引起了广泛的关注。与传统信贷业务相比，存货质押业务

引入了新的参与主体——物流企业作为监督者，在一定程度上改善了金融机构与

融资企业间的信息不对称问题。但金融机构往往为了实现自身收益最大化、风险

最小化，而通过契约最大限度地将风险转嫁给物流企业，加之金融机构对物流企

业的激励不足，导致物流企业进行存货质押业务的积极性不断降低，即由于金融

机构与物流企业激励机制的不完善制约着存货质押业务的发展。

因此，本研究以存货质押业务中金融机构与物流企业的激励为研究对象，以

委托代理和激励理论为理论基础，从信息不对称角度，运用类比和对比、博弈分

析、构建模型、算例研究等方法分析了二者间的委托代理关系，并提出了完善我

国存货质押业务中金融机构与物流企业激励机制的建议。

本研究的创新点主要体现在以下两个方面：（1）从理论分析和模型论证两方

面对存货质押业务中金融机构与物流企业的委托代理关系进行了界定，引入实际

案例对改进的激励模型的激励作用进行了验证；（2）结合我国存货质押业务中金

融机构与物流企业的激励机制实施现状、存货质押三方参与主体博弈模型分析、

委托代理激励机制的研究结果，完善了金融机构与物流企业的激励机制。

本文首先从基本内涵出发，对委托代理理论基础、经济学激励理论，存货质

押等方面的内容进行梳理，并对相关文献进行评析，为下面的研究做铺垫；接着

进入文章的核心部分，对存货质押业务中金融机构与物流企业的委托代理关系及

其激励现状进行了分析，并对存货质押业务中三方参与主体的行为进行了博弈均

衡分析，然后重点研究了金融机构与物流企业间的激励机制，通过算例分析验证

了改进的激励机制对物流企业的激励作用；最终得出如下结论：

1．存货质押业务三方参与主体构成双重委托代理关系

在存货质押这一创新型融资业务中，金融机构与物流企业之间存在着信息的

非对称性、契约关系和利益结构三大既定关系，具备构成委托代理关系的要件。

在存货质押业务中，物流企业同时作为金融机构的代理人和融资企业的委托人。

2．金融机构对物流企业采取的激励机制存在模式较为单一、报酬激励与业绩

不挂钩、声誉激励市场尚未形成等方面的不足。

3．金融机构对融资企业单独作假行为或融资企业与物流企业合谋作假行为进

行核查并能查实作假的概率与作假总收益成正比；与查实作假后对作假者的罚款

总额、不作假时物流企业和融资企业的正常收益成反比。

4．融资企业参与作假的概率与金融机构的核查成本、不作假时金融机构的正

常收益成正比；与金融机构能查实作假的概率、参与作假的预期总收益、作假被

查实的罚款总额成反比。

5．在金融机构现行的报酬“分成”激励机制下，金融机构与物流企业双方各

自的报酬最大化动机是不相容的，因此，物流企业可能会为了实现自身效用最大

化而牺牲金融机构利益。

6．当金融机构对物流企业采取“爪回”条款时，物流企业在一项存货质押业

务中获得的收益与金融机构收回贷款的速度同向变动。这就意味着，金融机构越

早收回贷款或者在早期收回的贷款越多，物流企业获得的收益越高；反之，则收

益越低。

7．若金融机构对不同资金规模的存货质押业务设立不同的收益分成比率，则

物流企业为多笔小额业务提供服务获得的业绩报酬低于为少数笔大额业务提供服

务获得的业绩报酬。

最后，根据以上结论，本研究提出改善金融机构与物流企业激励机制的实践

性建议，并指出本研究的局限性及未来的研究方向。

关键词：存货质押；委托代理；信息不对称；激励机制

III

ABSTRACT

As the rapid development of inventory pledge loan in China , more and more

Small and Medium-sized Enterprises have gained credit funds and improved funds

chain; Inventory pledge loan in China also has open up new profit marketplace for a lot

of logistics enterprises and financial institutions. Comparing to traditional credit

operations, Inventory pledge loan introduces a new partner——logistics enterprises as

a supervisor into the operations so as to improve the information asymmetry between

financial institutions and logistics enterprises. However, financial institutions are

trying to transfer their risks to logistics enterprises in order to maximize their revenue

and minimize risks. Meanwhile, insufficient incentives are dampening the initiative of

logistics enterprises. All of these problems restrict the further development of

inventory pledge loan.

Based on the background above, from the perspective of information asymmetry,

this dissertation selects incentives between financial institutions and logistics

enterprises of inventory pledge loan as the research object. This dissertation mainly

analyses the principal-agent relationship in financial institutions, which based on the

theories of Principal-Agent, Inspirit and Restrict, the knowledge of Game theory and

other related disciplines. Analogy and contrast, modeling, case studying are the main

methods. At last, according to the situation and drawbacks of inventory pledge loan in

China, this dissertation provides several countermeasures for the development of

inventory pledge loan incentive mechanisms.

The following two aspects indicate this dissertation’s innovation mainly: First,

this dissertation defines the principal-agent relationships of inventory pledge loan from

theoretical analysis and model proof, and uses a case to demonstrate the functions of

the improved incentive mechanism; second, this dissertation combines the present

situation of principal-agent incentive mechanism, gambling model analysis and

findings of principal-agent incentive mechanism of inventory pledge loan, and then

consummates the principal-agent incentive mechanism.

This dissertation starting from the basic theories of principal-agent, incentive

mechanism and inventory pledge loan, and then entering into the core parts which

analyzes the principal-agent relationship and existing incentive mechanism between

financial institutions and logistics enterprises. Meanwhile, the tripartite game

equilibrium is analyzed, and then focus on how to improve the existing incentive

mechanism. By calculating the examples, it demonstrates that the improved incentive

mechanisms greatly encourage the logistics enterprises; finally, this dissertation gains

the conclusion as bellow:

1. Three participants of inventory pledge loan compose the dual principal-agent

relationships. Three fixed factors, which are asymmetric information, contractual

relationships and profit configuration, compose the dual principal-agents relationships.

In the inventory pledge loan, logistics enterprise acts as the agent of financial

institution and the principal of finance company.

2. The existing incentive mechanism between financial institutions and logistics

companies has three mainly disadvantage, such as the incentive mechanism is too

single, the rewards can’t match the performance and the reputation incentive

mechanism hasn’t formed.

3. The inspection and confirmation probability of financial institutions has a

positive relationship with total fraud revenue. However, it has a negative relationship

with fines, normal earnings of logistics enterprises and finance companies when there’s

no fraud.

4. The fraud probability of finance companies has a positive relationship with

the inspecting cost of financial institutions and the normal earnings of financial

institutions when there’s no fraud. However, it has a negative relationship with the

inspection and confirmation probability of financial institutions, the expected total

revenue and fines of fraud.

5. Under current revenue sharing incentive mechanism, the motivation of

maximizing profit of financial institution and logistics enterprise are incompatible.

Thus, logistics enterprise may sacrifice the benefit of financial institution in order to

maximize its own utility.

6. Revenue of logistics enterprise changes in the same direction of the

recovering speed of loans when financial institution takes a “Claw-Back” clause. This

means the sooner financial institution recovers the loans, the more logistics enterprise

gets. Conversely, the less it gets.

7. If financial institution sets different sharing ratios depending on the capital

scale of inventory pledge loans, logistics enterprise will get less from lots of small

business comparing to a few of large business.

Finally, according to the above conclusions, this dissertation offers several

practical advices for financial institutions in order to stimulate the enthusiasm of

logistics enterprises. Meanwhile, this dissertation indicates the limits and the future

direction of the research.

Keywords: Inventory Pledge Loans; Principal-Agent; Information Asymmetry;

Incentive Mechanism

第一章绪论················································································································· 1

第一节研究背景·································································································· 1

第二节研究意义与创新点·················································································· 2

第三节研究思路、方法与框架··········································································· 3

第二章理论基础与文献综述······················································································· 6

第一节委托代理理论·························································································· 6

第二节经济学激励理论······················································································ 9

第三节存货质押研究现状················································································ 11

第四节以往研究评价························································································ 14

第三章委托代理关系的识别及激励现状·································································· 16

第一节金融机构与物流企业委托代理关系的识别········································· 16

第二节存货质押业务中金融机构与物流企业的激励现状····························· 18

第四章金融机构与物流企业的激励研究································································ 21

第一节存货质押参与主体的三方博弈分析····················································· 21

第二节金融机构对物流企业的报酬“分成”激励机制的缺陷······················ 28

第三节改进的报酬“分成”激励机制····························································· 31

第四节金融机构对物流企业的声誉激励机制················································· 33

第五章算例研究········································································································· 38

第一节算例研究背景介绍················································································ 38

第二节改进的报酬“分成”激励机制的影响分析········································· 39

第六章研究结论与展望····························································································· 45

第一节研究结论与管理建议············································································· 45

第二节研究局限与未来研究方向····································································· 47

参考文献········································································································································· 48

硕士学位论文

VII

图目录

图 1-1 研究框架图.......................................................................................................... 5

图 2-1 存货质押融资业务模式.................................................................................... 12

图 3-1 不同贷款模式下委托代理关系的对比图........................................................ 17

图 3-2 存货质押业务的委托及激励过程.................................................................... 20

图 4-1 物流企业的博弈行为区间分布........................................................................ 24

图 4-2 融资企业的博弈行为区间分布........................................................................ 25

图 4-3 融资企业与物流企业的合作博弈区间分布（1）.......................................... 25

图 4-4 融资企业与物流企业的合作博弈区间分布（2）.......................................... 26

图 4-5 金融机构与物流企业收益关联图.................................................................... 30

图 4-6 物流企业的最佳努力水平................................................................................ 31

硕士学位论文

VIII

表目录

表4-1 存货质押参与主体三方博弈收益矩阵.............................................................23

表4-2 金融机构核查并核实作假概率与存货融资业务指标的关系.........................27

表4-3 融资企业作假的最佳概率与存货融资业务指标的关系.................................28

表5-1 分期等额收回贷款时物流企业的收益.............................................................40

表5-2 加速收回贷款时物流企业的收益.....................................................................41

表5-3 不同融资收益区间设立的收益分成比率.........................................................42

表5-4 收益分成比率不变时不同融资规模下物流企业的业绩报酬.........................43

表5-5 收益分成比率变动时不同融资规模下物流企业的业绩报酬.........................43

硕士学位论文

第一章绪论

第一节研究背景

一、存货质押创造三方共赢

自2005 年我国物流业全面开放至今，第三方物流企业（TPL）间的竞争愈演愈烈，其物

流产品也呈现高度同质化的趋势，物流行业的平均利润率下降至 2%左右，此般情形迫使 TPL

不得不开始寻求新的利润点。在传统的物流企业特别是仓储型物流企业向现代物流企业转型

的过程中，存货质押业务实际上为 TPL 开辟了新的增值服务业务，不仅使 TPL 获得了差异

化的竞争优势，而且使其作为金融机构和客户都相互信任的第三方，可以更好地融入到客户

的商品产销供应链中去，同时也加强了与金融机构的同盟关系，给自己带来新的利润增长点。

《中国中小企业信息化发展报告（2007）》显示，至 2007 年末，中国中小企业数量已达

到4200 多万家，占全国企业数量的 99.8%，其中经工商部门注册的中小企业 460 多万家，个

体经营户约 3800 多万家。中小企业所创造的最终产品和服务的价值占全国国内生产总值的

60%左右，生产的商品占社会销售总额的 60%，上交的税收已经超过总额的一半，提供了全

国80%左右的城镇就业岗位。中小企业在促进经济增长,扩大劳动就业,创造社会财富等方面

越来越凸显其重要性。随着我国中小企业的发展，其融资需求也在不断扩大。然而国家信息

中心的调查结果显示, 81%的中小企业认为 1年内的流动资金仅能满足部分需要，60.5%的中

小企业没有 1-3 年的中长期贷款。融资困难成为制约中小企业发展的主要瓶颈，这一问题主

要源于：中小企业可抵押的固定资产匮乏、企业规模较小、内部财务制度不健全、管理不规

范、抗风险能力弱等。以在库动产（包括原材料、在产品、产成品等）为质押物的存货质押

贷款业务则较好的解决了银企间的矛盾，为中小企业融资开辟了一条重要的途径。

与此同时,金融机构却面临着“想贷而不敢贷”的两难境地，一方面金融机构对广阔的中

小企业融资市场垂涎欲滴，另一方面又为抵押品不足、担保不够、风险评估体系不健全而可

能承担的风险苦恼不已。此时，存货质押贷款业务应运而生。在存货质押贷款业务中，物流

企业作为第三方可以为金融机构提供关于库存商品的充分信息和可靠的物资监管，降低了信

息不对称带来的风险，并且帮助质押贷款双方良好地解决了质物价值的评估、拍卖等难题，

降低了质物评估过程产生的高昂的费用，使金融机构有可能对中小企业发放频度高、数额小

的贷款。由此扩大和稳固了金融机构的客户群，树立自己的竞争优势，开辟新的利润来源，

也有利于吸收由此业务引发的派生存款。

由此可见，我国的存货质押业务已经成为金融机构和第三方物流企业重要的利润增长点，

为中小企业走出融资困境提供了一条捷径，创造了三方共赢的局面。

硕士学位论文

二、存货质押面临困境

存货质押业务作为一种新兴的金融创新产品，在国外早已兴起，无论在制度法规体系还

是技术层面都已发展成熟。但是，由于金融体系、法律法规等方面的差异致使国内存货质押

业务的发展远远滞后于国外，目前尚处于萌芽阶段。尽管存货质押业务能够带来可观的收益，

但也要面临诸多风险。融资企业造假违约、物流企业监管不力、物流企业与融资企业合谋欺

骗等现象都严重影响着金融机构提供存货质押服务的积极性。同样，由于金融机构往往通过

制定严格规定，最大限度地将部分风险责任转嫁给物流企业，而对物流企业的报酬激励又不

够等方面的原因，一些物流企业参与存货质押业务的积极性也受到了打击，使得物流企业处

于两难境地。追根究底，这些风险主要源于金融机构、融资企业和物流企业三者之间的信息

不对称和激励机制的不完善，从而使得处于信息劣势的金融机构和物流企业在参与该项业务

时缺乏积极性，制约了存货质押业务在我国的有效发展。

第二节研究意义与创新点

一、本研究的理论意义

国内外学者对存货质押业务的研究大多集中于对其定义、运作模式、运作流程等方面的

研究，近年来，少数学者开始涉足存货质押业务中风险研究，但大部分只是针对质押业务过

程中出现的风险，对风险监控、风险治理等方面的研究几乎还不曾涉及。本文的研究从信息

不对称的角度，利用委托代理理论、激励理论，对存货质押中金融机构与物流企业的激励机

制进行重点研究，提出了有别于以往的单一报酬显性激励的显性激励与声誉隐性激励相结合

的激励机制。

二、本研究的现实意义

存货质押作为一种能够实现多方共赢的业务，由于其运作过程中的信息不对称特征，使

得业务开展中存在着典型的委托代理问题，其潜在的代理风险是不容忽视的。本文通过对存

货质押中金融机构与物流企业的委托代理关系进行识别，试图建立一套合理的激励约束机制，

以此来减少存货质押中各参与主体间的代理成本，提高服务的整体抗风险能力。在此基础上，

通过对我国现今的存货质押业务中金融机构与物流企业的激励约束机制的实施现状及问题进

行分析，为完善二者间的激励机制提供了一些实践性的管理建议。

三、本研究的主要创新点

本研究的创新点主要体现在以下两个方面：

1．从理论分析和模型论证两方面对存货质押业务中金融机构与物流企业的委托代理关系

进行了界定并提出了改进的激励模型，通过引入实际案例对改进的激励模型的激励作用进行

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摘要：

I摘要随着越来越多的中小企业通过存货质押运作获得了银行贷款，改善资金链。同时，许多知名的物流企业和金融机构也因开展存货质押业务实现了新的利润增长，存货质押在我国已引起了广泛的关注。与传统信贷业务相比，存货质押业务引入了新的参与主体——物流企业作为监督者，在一定程度上改善了金融机构与融资企业间的信息不对称问题。但金融机构往往为了实现自身收益最大化、风险最小化，而通过契约最大限度地将风险转嫁给物流企业，加之金融机构对物流企业的激励不足，导致物流企业进行存货质押业务的积极性不断降低，即由于金融机构与物流企业激励机制的不完善制约着存货质押业务的发展。因此，本研究以存货质押业务中金融机构与物流企业的激励...

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