改革拖延及其在危机冲击下的突破——以土地财政为例

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浙江财经学院硕士学位论文

摘要

在中国转型进程中存在两个基本的事实：一是改革经常受到拖延，即长期不

利于经济效率和整个社会福利提高的经济政策迟迟得不到改变；二是受到拖延的

改革往往能在危机冲击下得以突破。现有文献在解释这两个现象时还不能令人完

全满意。对中国改革拖延的解释的不足之处在于：基于利益集团博弈的改革拖延

理论显然低估了中国的政府（无论是中央政府还是地方政府）的独立性。共产党

领导的政治制度和相对集中的权利结构使得政府并不是一个轻易受到利益集团

摆布的工具；基于有关改革知识缺乏的解释并没有进一步挖掘政策制定者面临如

此严重的知识约束的原因。而又由于危机作用于改革的机制与改革受到拖延的原

因联系紧密，在改革受到拖延的原因没有得到完全解释清楚之前，也难以阐明受

到拖延的改革在危机中得以突破的内在逻辑。所以，无论是出于进一步发展和完

善转型经济学理论的需要，还是出于为加快改革提供既有操作性又有针对性的政

策措施的现实需求，都有必要对近十几年来中国改革的拖延和突破问题进行更加

深入的探讨。

有鉴于此，本文提出了一个关于中国渐进式改革的推进机制的假说以说明当

这一机制在某些情况下失效时改革拖延便会出现。该机制认为中国的转型是在危

机的冲击下，中央政府和地方政府相互博弈向前推进的结果。具体的，“文革”

引发的社会危机使中央政府感受到了政权稳固受到威胁而开启了改革开放。但由

于中央政府面临改革知识的约束，改革具有较高的失败和逆转的风险。于是，中

央政府通过成功地建立起一套以经济增长为核心的政治激励体系，将改革的风险

转移到地方政府。地方政府响应政治激励而发生的激烈竞争使得他们经常愿意冒

着改革失败的风险，率先在辖区内进行改革。地方政府的改革试验为中央政府提

供了重要的改革知识。通过比较和选择之后，中央政府就会将成功的改革模式复

制到其他地方或者全国。但这种渐进改革的推进机制在两种情况下可能失效。一

是中央政府受制于意识形态而不鼓励甚至压制地方政府具有市场化性质的制度

创新；二是地方政府找到成本更低的非市场化改革的方法发展经济，结果导致中

央和地方都不愿意进行改革的尝试。

改革拖延进一步加剧扭曲的资源配置机制，并且引发一系列社会问题。这种

现状持续一段时间就可能引发危机，或在外部危机冲击之下使得由于改革拖延导

致的矛盾提前爆发。从而统治权因经济增速放缓，失业率增加等原因受到威胁，

中央政府不得不主动承担起改革的成本，在全国范围推进改革。于是中国的改革

浙江财经学院硕士学位论文

就表现出了危机期间加速推进的特征。

我们将以土地财政为例说明导致中国改革拖延的第二种原因以及在这种情

况下危机推动改革可能存在的内在机制。土地提供的财政收入和经济增长速度使

得地方政府不用再冒险进行改革试验就能够满足中央政府政治激励的要求。而土

地财政之所以受到地方政府的青睐，是因为实行这一政策的成本远比进行其他体

制改革的成本小得多。于是，在地方政府不再愿意进行改革试验之后，中央政府

一方面缺少了来自成功改革经验的反馈，面对改革时的知识约束问题得不到解

决；另一方面各地方政府提供的经济增长也可以保证政权稳固，所以中央政府也

不愿意进行改革。在这种情况下，危机除了直接影响中央政府的行为导致改革突

破之外，还可能通过削弱土地财政对改革的拖延作用而间接促进改革。

上述的理论假说经过 1998－2010 年期间中国省级面板数据的计量经济分析

之后，被证明是正确的。第一，在土地财政与中国市场化改革的计量检验中，土

地财政前的系数显著为负；第二，在加入危机变量的计量检验中，危机变量前系

数显著为正；第三，在加入危机与土地财政交互项的计量检验中，交互项前系数

显著为正，土地财政系数显著为负，说明危机冲击减弱了土地财政的改革拖延作

用。以上检验都通过了各种稳健性检验。

基于本文的研究结果，我们提出三条政策建议。首先，中央政府应该利用危

机加快推进改革；其次，加快改革的关键在于破除地方政府对土地财政的依赖；

最后，改变土地征用制度是目前化解地方政府对土地财政的依赖的最急需和最可

行的措施。

关键词：土地财政危机冲击改革拖延与突破面板模型

浙江财经学院硕士学位论文

ABSTRACT

There are two obvious characteristics in China's transition process: First, the

reform is usually delayed，it is said that the economic policies which have not been

conducive to the improvement of economic efficiency and social welfare are difficult

to be alternated; Second, Delayed-reform can often be a breakthrough after the crisis.

The existing literatures are not entirely satisfactory to explain both features. There is

some weakness in those theories about China’s reform delay. Those theories which

think that the reform delay is a game equilibrium among interest groups clearly

underestimated the independence of the Chinese governments (either the central

authority or local governments). The Communist leading political system and the

relative concentration of the right structure make the government not a tool that may

be easily subject to interest groups. Another theory which attributes the reform delay

to the lack of knowledge of the reform fails to analyze the reason why the

policymaker has to face to limited reform knowledge. What’s more, since the

mechanism of crisis effecting on the delayed reform is linked to the reason why

reform is delayed, it is difficult to explain precisely how the crisis promotes reform

before the reason of reform delay is put out. Therefore, regardless of the need for

further development and improvement of the transition economics theory, or the need

to provide both operational and targeted policy measures for speeding up the reform,

it is necessary to issues more in-depth discussion about the reform delay and its

breakthrough in the latest decade in China.

In view of this, the paper proposes a hypothesis on the mechanism of China's

gradual reform to explain the reform may be delayed on some conditions. In this

mechanism, the China's transition is the result of the game between the central

authority and local governments after the impetus of the crisis. Specific, the social

crisis caused by "Cultural Revolution” made the central authority feel the regimes

firmly under threat, so it opens the reform and opening up. However, due to the

central government’s less knowledge about reform, the reform has a higher risk of

failure and reversal. Then the central authority successfully established a set of

political incentive system which considered economic growth as the core to shift the

risk of the reform to local governments. Local governments preferred to accept the

III

浙江财经学院硕士学位论文

risk of reform because they all wanted to be promoted but there was fierce

competition among them. Local governments’ reform tests afford amount of reform

knowledge to the authority. After comparing and choosing these reform models, the

authority will copy successful reform model to other local places or all the country.

But the gradual reform mechanism may not be valid in two cases: one, the central

authority is subject to ideology so that it won’t encourage or even suppress the

innovation with the market-oriented nature induced by the local governments; two,

local governments may find a lower-cost method of non-market-oriented reforms to

promote economic growth, resulting in either the central authority or local

governments are reluctant to reform attempts.

Reform delay will further exacerbate the distortion of resource allocation

mechanism, and trigger a series of social problems. This situation may lead to a crisis,

or the impact of the abroad crisis aggravates these problems so that a native crisis

breaks. Both cause economic growth to slowdown, the unemployment rate to increase

and so on. As a result, the regime suffered threat. The central authority has to take the

initiative action to assume the cost of reform, promote reform across the country or

wider regions. So China's reform was accelerated during the crisis.

We will take land finance as an example to illustrate the second reason of

China’s reform delay mentioned above and the possible mechanism of crisis’s

impacting on reform in this case. Only using land, local governments can afford

enough financial income and economic growth rate to meet the requirements of the

central authority，so they won't risk to make reform. Land finance was pro-gazed by

local governments because the cost of this policy was much less than other reform

cost. Thus, after local governments are no longer willing to make reform test, one

hand the central authority can’t receive the feedback from the experience of

successful reform, in other word, the central authority is limited to little reform

knowledge. On the other hand, the local governments have provided sufficient

economic growth to ensure that the regime is solid, so the central government is not

willing to reform, either. In this case, except directly prompting reform by enforcing impact on

the central authority, the crisis may also indirectly weaken the land finance’s delay

impact on reform so that the reform can be promoted more quickly.

Above theoretical hypothesis has been proved correct by the Chinese provincial

panel data during 1998 to 2010. Firstly, in the test on the relation between land

finance and market-oriented reforms, the land finance variable's coefficient is

浙江财经学院硕士学位论文

significantly negative. Secondly, after adding the crisis variable to the model, the

crisis variable’s coefficient is significantly positive. Thirdly, after adding the

interaction term of land finance and crisis to the model and doing econometric test

again, the interaction term’s coefficient is significantly negative, indicating that the

crisis will weaken the land finance delayed impact on the market-oriented reform. The

above results are also confirmed by various robustness tests.

Finally, based on the results of this study, we propose three policy

recommendations. First of all, the central authority should utilize the crisis to put

reform forward more quickly. Secondly, the key to prompt reform is to get rid of the

dependence of local government’s dependence on land finance. Finally, change the

system of land acquisition is the most urgent and feasible measure for breaking down

local government’s dependence on land finance.

Keywords：land finance；crisis；reform delay and breakthrough；panel model

浙江财经学院硕士学位论文

第一章绪论..................................................................................................................1

第一节选题背景与问题的提出...........................................................................1

第二节研究目的及意义.......................................................................................2

第三节研究思路及主要内容概括.......................................................................4

第四节研究方法与创新之处...............................................................................7

第五节重点难点与不足之处...............................................................................8

第二章文献综述..........................................................................................................9

第一节改革拖延与危机冲击：现有文献的阐述...............................................9

第二节关于现有理论的述评.............................................................................12

第三节两种经济增长方式：土地财政和市场化改革.....................................13

第三章土地财政、危机冲击与改革：一个理论分析框架....................................15

第一节中国渐进改革的推进机制.....................................................................15

第二节政府选择何种发展经济的政策取决于实施该政策的成本.................18

第三节土地财政、危机冲击与改革的关系：三个理论假说.........................19

第四章实证研究：基于省级的面板数据................................................................22

第一节计量模型.................................................................................................22

第二节变量的选择.............................................................................................23

第三节实证结果及讨论.....................................................................................24

第五章稳健性检验....................................................................................................31

第一节土地财政Ⅱ的检验结果.........................................................................31

第二节不同的危机阀值.....................................................................................32

第三节加入控制变量.........................................................................................33

第四节分地区进行回归.....................................................................................35

第五节 2SLS法和动态GMM估计......................................................................37

第六章研究结论和政策建议....................................................................................39

第一节研究结论.................................................................................................39

第二节政策建议.................................................................................................40

参考文献......................................................................................................................42

附录..............................................................................................................................47

致谢..............................................................................................................................48

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摘要：

浙江财经学院硕士学位论文摘要在中国转型进程中存在两个基本的事实：一是改革经常受到拖延，即长期不利于经济效率和整个社会福利提高的经济政策迟迟得不到改变；二是受到拖延的改革往往能在危机冲击下得以突破。现有文献在解释这两个现象时还不能令人完全满意。对中国改革拖延的解释的不足之处在于：基于利益集团博弈的改革拖延理论显然低估了中国的政府（无论是中央政府还是地方政府）的独立性。共产党领导的政治制度和相对集中的权利结构使得政府并不是一个轻易受到利益集团摆布的工具；基于有关改革知识缺乏的解释并没有进一步挖掘政策制定者面临如此严重的知识约束的原因。而又由于危机作用于改革的机制与改革受到拖延的原因联系紧密，在改革...

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