机构投资者对抑制公司过度投资的影响研究

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浙江财经学院硕士学位论文

摘要

投资对于拉动经济增长至关重要，但是我国企业存在着过度投资现象，既造

成资源浪费也损害了股东财富，如何有效抑制公司过度投资成为研究的热点。在

过度投资的各种制约机制中，机构投资者向积极股东转变对抑制过度投资的作用

开始受到关注。但是现有的文献大部分是研究机构投资者持股比例与过度投资和

董事会的相关性，本文从机构投资者相对于其他股东具有的特点和其新兴股东的

角色定位出发，选取董事会治理的角度研究机构投资者对公司过度投资的抑制作

用。

本文首先分析了机构投资者与其他股东的不同之处以及机构投资者在公司治

理中的作用，然后以董事会为参与公司治理的实现形式，分析机构投资者提高董

事会投资决策水平以达到抑制公司过度投资行为。在理论分析的基础上，选取沪

深A股上市公司数据，度量公司的过度投资水平，并将董事会治理作为调节变量，

实证分析机构投资者持股对过度投资水平的影响。

理论研究的结果表明：（1）机构投资者参与董事会改变大股东一言堂局面，

一定程度上形成对大股东的制衡，提高大股东做出损害公司价值增加私人收益的

过度投资决策的门槛，而且机构投资者参与董事会有助于增强独立董事的独立性，

更好地代表全体股东的利益；（2）机构投资者参与董事会能将自身的专业和信息

优势带入公司，减轻信息不对称下管理者过度自信和非职业化的董事引发的过度

投资；（3）机构投资者参与董事会能弥补国有股东所有者的缺位，提高董事会对

管理者的制约水平，抑制过度投资。实证研究的结果同时也表明：（1）许多上市

公司中存在着过度投资现象；（2）机构投资者通过提高独立董事比例、推进两职

分离改善董事会治理来抑制过度投资的影响比较显著，而通过董事会下属的委员

会减轻过度投资的作用没有通过显著性检验。综上所述，机构投资者通过参与董

事会治理是能够对抑制过度投资产生作用的。

文章通过理论和实证的分析，表明机构投资者参与董事会能减轻过度投资，

为此，我国必须大力发展机构投资者，使其在更大程度上发挥作用，在此基础上

提出机构投资者发展的建议：与大股东抗衡需要逐步放宽准入机制和持股比例的

限制，提高机构投资者持股比例；促进机构投资者多元化发展，形成竞争格局；

在单个持股比例达不到要求的情况下，鼓励机构投资者采取联合行动，参与公司

治理；另外要加强对机构投资者的监管，并且为机构投资者参与公司治理创造良

好的外部环境，完善股权结构，提高上市公司质量。

本文的创新之处在于：将机构投资者在公司治理中的作用延伸到财务管理领

浙江财经学院硕士学位论文

域，机构投资者作为股东有参与公司治理投高公司绩效水平的意愿，而公司治理

效率的提高会体现在公司具体的财务行为上，因而本文分析了机构投资者通过董

事会对公司过度投资行为的抑制作用；而对机构投资者与董事会、过度投资关系

的研究不只是单纯研究其相关性，本文进一步阐述机构投资者参与后能改善股权

结构，又具有不同于其他股东的特质和专业优势，能有效改善董事会投资决策，

抑制过度投资。

关键词：机构投资者；董事会；管理层；过度投资；委托代理

浙江财经学院硕士学位论文

III

ABSTRACT

Investment is essential for economic development, but in China over-investment is

widespread today, it’s a waste of resource as well as damaging the value of the company.

How to suppress over-investment effectively is hotspot. In kinds of restrict machining of

over investment, institutional investors turn to be positive shareholder and could

suppress over investment has been paid close attention. But majority of exist research

are on the relevance between the percent of institutional investors’ shareholder and over

investment, this article based on the features and institutional investors as new

shareholder, select board governance as a angle research the effect of institutional

investors on over-investment.

First of all, the article analyzes the differences between institutional investors and

other shareholders as well as the action of institutional investors in corporate

governance. Then, via Board as realization form of participating in corporate

governance, analysis institutional investors improving the investment decisions of the

Board directors that suppress over investment. On the basis of theoretical analysis,

select data of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies, measure the level of

over-investment, and add Board governance as a regulate variables, via empirical

analyzes the effect of institutional investors on over-investment.

Theoretical research results show that: (1) institutional investors to participate in

the Board of directors to change one-man situation of a major shareholder, to some

extent, formatting the checks and balances on the major shareholders, raise the threshold

for large shareholders to make the over-investment decisions that damage the value of

company and increase the private benefits, and institutional investors to participate in

the Board helps to strengthen the independence of the independent directors, to

represent the interests of all shareholders better ; (2) institutional investors to participate

in the Board can apply their own expertise and information superiority into the company,

reducing over-investment caused by managers overconfidence and non-professional

directors under asymmetric information; institutional investors to participate in the

Board to make up the absence of the owner of the state-owned shareholders, to improve

the level of the constraints of the Board on managers, to curb excessive investment.

Empirical results also show that: (1) over-investment phenomenon exist in many listed

companies; (2) the impact of institutional investors to curb excessive investment by

increasing the proportion of independent directors, and to promote the two grade

浙江财经学院硕士学位论文

separation to improve board governance is more significantly, by the committee of the

board of directors to reduce the excessive investment does not pass the test of

significance. In summary, the institutional investors to be able to participate in board

governance on the curb excessive investment role.

Through theoretical and empirical analysis shows that institutional investors to

participate in the Board can reduce over-investment, China must develop the

institutional investors vigorously, make it play a role in the greater extent, based on it

give some recommendations of the development of institutional investors: to compete

with the major shareholders require the gradual relaxation of the restriction of the access

mechanism and the shareholding ratio, increase the proportion of institutional investors’

holding; promote diversified development of institutional investors, form the

competitive landscape; under the situation that a single shareholder cannot meat the

holding requirement, to encourage institutional investors to take joint action to

participate in corporate governance; in addition, to strengthen the supervision of

institutional investors, to create a favorable external environment for the participation of

institutional investors in corporate governance, to improve equity structure, improve the

quality of listed companies.

The innovation of this paper is that: extend the role of institutional investors in

corporate governance to the area of financial management, institutional investors as

shareholders have the intention to participate in corporate governance and cast high

level of corporate performance, corporate governance efficiency will be reflected in the

company specific financial behavior, and thus paper analyzes the inhibition of excessive

investment that institutional investors through the Board of Directors; research on

institutional investors and board of directors, over-investment in this article is not only

about the relationship but also further elaborated that institutional investors participation

can improve the ownership structure, and different from the characteristics of the other

shareholders and own the professional advantages, can effectively improve the

investment decisions of the Board, to curb excessive investment.

Keywords: Institutional Investors；Overinvestment；Board Governance

浙江财经学院硕士学位论文

第一章绪论 ................................................................................................................. 1

第一节选题背景及意义 ...................................................................................... 1

第二节国内外相关文献综述 .............................................................................. 2

第三节研究方法和论文结构 ............................................................................ 10

第四节创新点 .................................................................................................... 12

第二章机构投资者和公司投资相关理论 ............................................................... 13

第一节机构投资者概念、特征及其在公司治理中的作用 ............................ 13

第二节公司治理理论 ........................................................................................ 16

第三节委托代理理论和信息不对称理论 ........................................................ 16

第三章机构投资者参与董事会对公司过度投资的影响 ....................................... 18

第一节过度投资的三大表现及成因 ................................................................ 18

第二节机构投资者参与董事会能有效制衡过度投资 .................................... 20

第三节机构投资者参与董事会能促进决策科学化 ...................................... 22

第四节机构投资者参与董事会能减轻内部人控制抑制过度投资 ................ 23

第四章机构投资者参与董事会对过度投资影响的实证分析 ............................... 25

第一节实证思路与假设 .................................................................................... 25

第二节样本选择与数据来源 ............................................................................ 26

第三节上市公司过度投资度量模型 ................................................................ 26

第四节机构投资者参与董事会与过度投资相关性模型 .............................. 30

第五章结论及建议 ................................................................................................... 35

第一节研究结论 ................................................................................................ 35

第二节发展我国机构投资者的建议 ................................................................ 35

结束语 ......................................................................................................................... 39

参考文献 ..................................................................................................................... 40

附录......................................................................................................................... 45

致谢......................................................................................................................... 46

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摘要：

浙江财经学院硕士学位论文摘要投资对于拉动经济增长至关重要，但是我国企业存在着过度投资现象，既造成资源浪费也损害了股东财富，如何有效抑制公司过度投资成为研究的热点。在过度投资的各种制约机制中，机构投资者向积极股东转变对抑制过度投资的作用开始受到关注。但是现有的文献大部分是研究机构投资者持股比例与过度投资和董事会的相关性，本文从机构投资者相对于其他股东具有的特点和其新兴股东的角色定位出发，选取董事会治理的角度研究机构投资者对公司过度投资的抑制作用。本文首先分析了机构投资者与其他股东的不同之处以及机构投资者在公司治理中的作用，然后以董事会为参与公司治理的实现形式，分析机构投资者提高董事会投资决策水平...

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