我国上市公司高管薪酬激励机制研究

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浙江财经学院硕士学位论文

摘要

国内有关高管薪酬激励法规的出台和科龙公司高额薪酬案例的发生，引发了

学术界对上市公司高管薪酬激励关注。国内上市公司也将会推行新的高管薪酬激

励措施，以期进一步完善上市公司的治理结构。国内外学术界对高管薪酬激励机

制的研究已有八十余年，涉及会计学、财务学、管理学、数理经济学、产业经济

学、劳动力经济学和组织经济学等多种学科，近十年的相关研究主要集中在股票

期权、高管薪酬与公司经营业绩相关性分析、公司治理结构与高管薪酬的关系等

方面。

本文主要从高管薪酬水平与结构、高管利益与股东利益之间的关系、高管薪

酬激励存在的问题及原因三个方面分析国内上市公司的高管薪酬激励现状。结果

表明，（一）我国上市公司的高管人员薪酬水平增长较快，薪酬结构中固定薪酬比

例较高，变动薪酬中以绩效奖金居多，采用股票期权等激励工具的并不多。（二）

高管利益应与股东利益关联起来，而不是仅仅与公司业绩关联起来。通过对国内

上市公司近两年的数据分析，发现我国上市公司的高管人员利益与股东利益之间

不存在正相关关系，甚至还呈现出背道而驰的趋势。（三）我国高管薪酬激励机制

存在的问题主要是高管薪酬与股东利益不相关，究其原因主要是基本薪酬过高、

经营目标与业绩指标之间存在较大的差异、部分公司采取了奖金递延发放的发放

方式、存在激励的空白区、部分公司并没有采取严格的激励措施。

本文中激励机制设计的理论基础主要是委托代理理论、需要层次理论和人力

资本理论等理论，本文分别就这些理论结合实际情况予以评述。根据 AL·埃巴所

提出的有效激励机制应该达到的四个目标，本文提出我国上市公司有效的高管薪

酬激励机制所应满足的条件。通过对股票和经济增加值在高管薪酬激励机制中应

用的重点分析并加以评述，本文按照有效薪酬激励机制应满足的条件，将经营业

绩与公司股票价格变动融为一体，设计了一套适合我国上市公司的有效薪酬激励

机制。

本文认为，我国高管薪酬激励机制不宜采用股票期权等措施授予高管人员股

票的所有权，高管人员只应享有与其自身人力资本价值相当的股份的收益权，该

收益权包括公司业绩变动带来的收益和股票价格变动带来的收益两部分；薪酬的

浙江财经学院硕士学位论文

激励区间上下均不设限，取消人为设置的激励空白区；为防止高管任期内公司亏

损严重，高管人员在任期开始时需要交纳一定的风险基金；高管薪酬的支付方式

采用递延支付；此外，业绩指标可以采用每股收益（扣除）和每股经济增加值变

动额中的任意一个指标，均不影响该激励机制的有效性。

高管薪酬激励机制的检验分析是以王府井股份公司相关数据为案例进行数据

验证和分析，以每股收益（扣除）和每股经济增加值的变动额作为业绩指标分别

计算并比较分析。检验结果表明，所设计出的薪酬激励机制明显比该公司原来设

计的薪酬激励措施有效并且节省，而业绩指标采用每股经济增加值变动额的薪酬

激励机制比采用每股收益的薪酬激励机制更为有效且更节省。

本文的创新点主要有三点：一是认为高管人员的薪酬应该与股东利益相关，

而不是仅仅与公司业绩相关。二是对虚拟股票计划进行改进。虚拟股票的改进计

划使得高管人员只拥有被授予股份数的收益权，收益权包括公司业绩和股票价格

变动两方面的收益，同时增大公司业绩收益所占比例。三是通过对高管人员的人

力资本价值评估，授予高管人员相应价值的股份，并以此分享收益。

关键词：高管薪酬；激励；股票期权；经济增加值；激励机制

浙江财经学院硕士学位论文

III

ABSTRACT

As our government enacts relevant laws and regulations about the compensation

incentives for the executive and the case of KeLong Corporation’s high compensation

for its CEO arose the concerns of the academic circles for the executive compensation

of listed companies. The domestic listed companies will carry out new incentive

measures of the executive compensation and further improve the governance structure

of listed companies. The scholars have studied the high compensation for the executive

system for over eighty years, concerning disciplines such as accounting, finance. Then

this thesis discusses some influential motivation theories such as principal agent theory,

Hierarchy of Needs Theory, Human Capital Theory and comments them respectively

with real situations. Then it briefly introduces and summarizes some representative

opinions on the theoretical research of theories of executive compensation, both home

and abroad.

Through the analysis of the current situation of the executive compensation

incentive from three aspects: the level and structure of the executive compensation, the

relationship between the interest of the executive and that of the shareholder and the

present problems of the executive compensation and their reasons. This thesis states that

the increment of the executive compensation of domestic listed companies is rapid, that

the proportion of the fixed compensation in the structure of the executive compensation

is high and the flexible compensations mainly are performance bonuses and that the

adoption of incentive tools such as the stock option are very few. This thesis also holds

that the interest of the executive and that of the shareholder shall be connected in

addition to the performance of companies. The analysis of recent two years’ data of

domestic listed companies shows that there are no positive correlation relationships

between the interest of the executive and that of the shareholder, and even it has a

deviant trend. The major problem of the domestic executive compensation incentive

mechanism is the irrelevance between the executive compensation and the interest of

the shareholder. Its main reasons are the relatively larger fixed compensation, the great

浙江财经学院硕士学位论文

discrepancies of between operation goals and performance targets, the postpone of the

distribution of bonuses adopted by some companies, the existing blanks of incentives,

the failure of some companies to carry out incentive mechanism strictly.

The theoretical bases of the incentive system designed in this thesis are the

Principal Agent Theory, the Hierarchy of Needs Theory and the Manpower Theory. On

the basis of the above problems and the combination of the four targets put forward by

Al Ehrbar which an effective incentive mechanism should reach, the thesis poses the

requirements which our domestic effective executive compensation incentive shall meet.

Through the analysis of the key points of the application of the stocks and the EVA in

the mechanism, the thesis finds out the problems of these incentive tools. On the basis

of the detailed analysis of the application and in accordance with the requirements, this

thesis devises an effective executive compensation incentive mechanism, suitable to the

domestic listed companies. This thesis holds that the domestic executive compensation

incentive mechanism shall not adopt measures such as the stock option to give the

executive the ownership of the stocks and the executive shall only have the right to

obtain the return of the stocks , equivalent to the value of their own human capital,

which includes the interest resulted from the increase of the performance of companies

and the changes in the prices of shares; that the incentive range of compensation shall

not be limited and cancel the artificial incentive blanks; that in the order to prevent large

losses of the profits of the companies in his term, the executive shall submit a certain

amount of the risk fund at the beginning of his term; that the executive compensation

shall be paid in deference; that the performance targets could adopt either earning per

share deduction or the change amount of the EVA, which does not influence the

effectiveness of the mechanism.

This thesis tests and analyzes the compensation incentive mechanism with the data

of WangFuJing Listed Company and the performance index adopts earning per share

and the changed amount of EVA to compute respectively, compare and analyze the

results. The results show that the devised mechanism is obviously more effective and

more economical than the original one, and it also shows that the performance index of

浙江财经学院硕士学位论文

the compensation incentive mechanism adopts the changed amount of EVA is more

effective and more economical than which adopts the earning per share.

There are mainly three novelties in the thesis, first, it holds the compensation of the

executive shall not be only related to the interest of the shareholder but also the

performance of the company. Second, it improves phantom stock. The improved

phantom stock endows executive the right of return of stock option. The right includes

firm performance and the change of stock price, and increases the proportion of

earnings. Third, the value of the stock option is equal to the human capital of executive,

and shares the earnings.

Keywords：executive compensation; incentive; stock option; economic value

added; incentive system

浙江财经学院硕士学位论文

第一章绪论......................................................... 1

第一节研究背景及意义 ............................................. 1

第二节国内外研究综述 ............................................. 2

第三节研究方法、思路及创新点 .................................... 10

第四节论文结构 .................................................. 11

第二章激励机制设计的理论基础...................................... 13

第三章我国上市公司高管薪酬激励现状分析............................ 18

第一节高管薪酬水平及其结构 ...................................... 18

第二节高管利益与股东利益相关性分析 .............................. 22

第三节存在的问题及其原因 ........................................ 26

第四章我国上市公司高管薪酬激励机制的设计.......................... 29

第一节有效的薪酬激励机制应具备的条件 ............................ 29

第二节经济增加值应用分析 ........................................ 30

第三节股票期权及衍生品应用分析 .................................. 33

第四节高管薪酬激励机制的设计 .................................... 39

第五章案例检验分析................................................ 43

第一节案例公司介绍 .............................................. 43

第二节案例数据检验与分析 ........................................ 43

第三节结果讨论 .................................................. 55

第六章结束语...................................................... 58

参考文献............................................................ 61

致谢............................................................... 64

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摘要：

浙江财经学院硕士学位论文I摘要国内有关高管薪酬激励法规的出台和科龙公司高额薪酬案例的发生，引发了学术界对上市公司高管薪酬激励关注。国内上市公司也将会推行新的高管薪酬激励措施，以期进一步完善上市公司的治理结构。国内外学术界对高管薪酬激励机制的研究已有八十余年，涉及会计学、财务学、管理学、数理经济学、产业经济学、劳动力经济学和组织经济学等多种学科，近十年的相关研究主要集中在股票期权、高管薪酬与公司经营业绩相关性分析、公司治理结构与高管薪酬的关系等方面。本文主要从高管薪酬水平与结构、高管利益与股东利益之间的关系、高管薪酬激励存在的问题及原因三个方面分析国内上市公司的高管薪酬激励现状。结果表明，（一）...

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