我国农村集体所有权的虚化——一个债务压力推动的土地产权制度变迁的案例

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浙江财经学院硕士学位论文

摘要

随着工业化和城市化的发展，我国农民收入增长缓慢、农民土地财产权益受到侵害、

农村基层组织缺乏对农民的凝聚力等一系列问题愈显突出，这些问题直接关系到我国农

业的健康发展以及农村的繁荣和稳定，也关系到我国全面建设小康社会目标的实现，迫

切需要从制度层面进行分析。

我国农村集体经济是建立在土地的农民集体所有基础上的，这是我国农村经济和社

会最基本的现实。基于这一现实，本文通过建立农村集体经济所有权虚化的理论模型和

对我国中部地区一个由集体经济债务压力推动的农地产权制度变迁案例的实证研究，剖

析我国农村集体经济制度的根本缺陷和“三农”问题的制度根源，并为农村集体经济组

织和农地产权制度改革提出相应的建议。

在农村集体经济所有权虚化的理论模型中，本文首先在分析我国农地产权基本结构

的基础上得出我国农村集体所有制内部权利结构的特点，然后分析了村委会作为村集体

和乡镇基层政府的双重代理人以及这种特殊身份对其行为的影响。集体所有制内部权利

结构的特点和村委会的双重代理身份决定了村委会拥有对集体经济的控制权，但是又不

承担决策风险。不受约束的代理人的高风险偏好行为使其投资决策具有相当大的盲目

性，再加上集体经济委托代理中难以克服的道德风险问题，加大了集体企业失败的概率。

在村委会享有对农村集体经济控制权的情况下，其成员为了自身利益更可能利用控制权

对集体经济项目失败产生的遗留问题加以分配，最终必然侵蚀农民财产权益。

通过对我国中部地区一个由集体经济债务压力推动的农村土地产权制度变迁的代

表性案例的实证研究，本文对集体经济所有权虚化的理论模型进行了验证。文章详细分

析了该村沉重债务负担及其形成过程、债务负担沉重的原因、该村的偿债手段、偿债过

程与其困境以及最后在债务压力下实行的利用土地承包权偿债的制度安排。在该村集体

经济中，村民代表大会失去了对村委会的监督和制约功能，村委会作为乡镇基层政府和

村集体的双重代理人行使集体经济的控制权，但是并不承担决策风险。于是，村委会为

了其成员自身利益偏向民间非正规金融高息融资以筹集建设资金兴办村级集体企业。盲

目决策和集体企业的经营不善，以及农村非正规金融和高利贷，给该村带来了极其沉重

浙江财经学院硕士学位论文

的债务包袱。在湖北省实行农村税费改革的背景下，该村找不到更好的解决村级债务的

途径，最终实行了目前具有典型性的利用农村土地承包权偿债的制度安排。虽然该村重

大经济事务的决策过程，遵循了从村委会—债权人—村民议事代表会议—普通村民的合

法程序，各个利益主体的行为也都没有超越现行集体经济制度的框架，但是整个耕地调

整过程的实际却是在农村集体经济所有权虚化的状态下，村委会以集体所有权代理人的

身份，利用手中土地控制权做出的以自身利益最大化为目标的农地使用权调整，最终产

生了侵蚀农民土地财产权利的结果。

结合农村集体经济所有权虚化的理论模型和农村土地产权制度变迁的实证研究，我

们得出结论:农村集体经济的所有权是其他一切权利的基础，集体经济所有权的虚化是

农村集体经济制度的根本制度缺陷，也是“三农问题”重要的制度根源。从根本上说，

是所有权作为一级产权决定了各种层次产权的权能和运作，仅仅依靠农业和农村的外部

途径或者对使用权、收益权等二级产权的改良不能从根源上克服我国农村土地产权制度

的内在缺陷，必须建立起一种能够促使农业和农村内部积累资产和财富的激励制度，使

集体经济成员的权利相互平衡和一般村民的权利得到切实保障以不受集体经济代理人

的侵犯，农村和农业才有自己的“造血”机制。而这又关键在于农村集体所有权的安排，

要使农民的所有权能够不被剥夺，必须使农户在财产上能够自主，能够有效的保卫自己

的财产权利，或者不必经过代理人而自主决策，或者能够有效制约和监督代理人的行为。

本文在以下几个方面进行了新的探索并有所创新：第一，目前国内研究大多集中于

农村土地的所有权、使用权以及收益权等抽象的理论概念层面，而本论文将利用风险理

论和委托-代理理论，从一切公有产权的共同属性特征等更深层面进行分析，并特别针

对各个行为主体之间的权利和利益关系进行了实证研究和理论剖析，揭示出我国农村土

地集体所有制的内部关系和特征，挖掘农村集体所有制的结构缺陷，促进我国集体经济

产权制度研究的深化。第二，本文揭示了我国农村社会中村委会作为村集体和乡镇基层

政府的双重代理人的身份，并运用确定性等值和风险贴水等概念分析了村集体的风险偏

好行为倾向对其投资决策的影响，给出了农村集体企业失败高概率的一个合理的理论解

释。第三，本文以委托-代理理论为分析框架，建立非对称信息条件下的道德风险模型，

以村集体经济代理人风险偏好行为特征为基础，得出了风险偏好的代理人对线形契约的

反应以及这种条件下最优激励合同的制约因素。第四，目前国内大多研究者主张在坚持

土地集体所有制的条件下进行适当调整，其中最主要的理由是土地对农民具有社会保障

浙江财经学院硕士学位论文

III

功能。但是通过对湖北农村土地产权变迁案例的实证研究证明，农村集体所有制的内部

结构缺陷必然导致土地的社会保障功能的弱化，因为它随时都可能受到来自集体经济内

部的所有权代理人的侵蚀。这将为我国农村土地产权制度创新提供理论支持。

关键词：农村集体经济；土地产权制度变迁；所有权虚化；双重代理；风险偏好行

为；道德风险

浙江财经学院硕士学位论文

Abstract

With the development of industrialization and urbanization, a series of problems in rural

areas become more and more prominent, such as the slow rise of farmers’ income, the

infringement of land interests and rights, the lack of cohesion between basic-level rural

organizations and farmers and so on. These problems are obviously needed to be dealt with

since they are directly related with the sound development of agriculture and the prosperity

and stability in rural areas. They also have something to do with the overall objective of

building a well-off society, so it is imperative to analyze them at institutional level.

It is a basic fact in China that the collective economy in countryside is based on the

collective ownership of land. Based on the fact, through the establishment of virtualization of

collective ownership and an empirical analysis of the case of institutional transition of land

property rights driven by the debt pressure in collective economy, the article presents the

underlying deficiency of the collective economy and the institutional source for the problem

of “Agriculture, Rural areas and Farmers”. And then I should give some suggestions on the

reform of the collective economy organizations in the countryside and the system of land

property rights.

In the first part, I firstly obtain the characteristic of collective economy ownership in the

countryside basis on the analysis of basic structure about the farmland rights and then analyze

the behavior of influence of village committee as to be a village collectivity and village basic

level government as a special identities of dual agent that the collective economy rights

structure and the dual agent identities of the village committee gives the village committee

rights to control the collective economy without bearing the brunt of risk decisions. But the

risk preference behavior intention of the uncontrolled agent leads the investment decision into

much blindness. What’s worse is that the moral hazard is very hard to overcome in the

principal agent.

After that, the article conducts certification on the model through a model where a land

浙江财经学院硕士学位论文

property rights system transition driven by the debt pressure. It has detailed analysis on the

debt burden of the village, its formation, reason for that, way of debt satisfaction, process and

dilemma. The decision-making procedure of Sifangdun village from the village inside body,

to village-level creditor, village member representative meeting to common villager, and the

composition of village committee and the representative shows that the committee, with its

power of the agency for land property rights, make land use rights adjustment for maximizing

its own interest, while the land property rights of farmers will be infringed finally.

Integrated with theoretical model of virtualization of the ownership of the collective

economy in rural area and the empirical analysis of the transition of land property rights

system, it concludes that the ownership of collective economy is the basis of all other rights,

its virtualization is an important institutional root for the problem of “Agriculture, Rural areas

and Farmers”. Basically, it is the ownership as the first-level property right that determines the

function and operation of various levels of property rights, so only external approaches for the

agriculture and the rural areas and the betterment of secondary property rights such as use

rights and proceeding right can’t overcome the inherent deficiency of the system of land

property rights in China rural areas, where an incentive system promoting the internal

accumulation of assets and wealth inside the agriculture and the countryside shall be

established so that the rights of members of the collective economy will be balanced and the

rights of common farmers will be rigorously guaranteed with no infringement by the agent of

the collective economy, in this way, the “blood-making” mechanism can be furnished for the

agriculture and the countryside. The key to the aforesaid lies in the arrangement of the

collective ownership, where the farmers shall be autonomous at their disposal of properties

and capable of protecting their own property rights, or they can have their discretion with no

appeal to the agent, meanwhile, the acts of the agent shall be effectively controlled and

supervised.

The article presents innovation and new exploration in several aspects. First, it discloses

village committee acts as the dual-agency of village collective organization and town

government, and uses certainty equivalent and risk premium to analyze the role of the risk

preference behavior in the village decision, giving a reasonable explanation of high possibility

浙江财经学院硕士学位论文

of failure of village-run enterprises. Second, based on the framework of the Principal-agent

Theory, it establishes a moral risk modal under the condition of asymmetric information,

concluding that the reaction of agent with risk preference to the linear agreement; third,

judging from the empirical analysis of case of Hubei land property rights, the internal

structure in the ownership system of village collective organization will inevitably cause the

weakening of the social security function of land, since it is susceptible to infringement easily,

which will provide theoretical support to the innovation of the system of land property rights.

Key words: rural collective economy; institutional transition of land property rights;

virtualization of ownership; dual agency; risk preference behavior; moral hazard

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摘要：

浙江财经学院硕士学位论文I摘要随着工业化和城市化的发展，我国农民收入增长缓慢、农民土地财产权益受到侵害、农村基层组织缺乏对农民的凝聚力等一系列问题愈显突出，这些问题直接关系到我国农业的健康发展以及农村的繁荣和稳定，也关系到我国全面建设小康社会目标的实现，迫切需要从制度层面进行分析。我国农村集体经济是建立在土地的农民集体所有基础上的，这是我国农村经济和社会最基本的现实。基于这一现实，本文通过建立农村集体经济所有权虚化的理论模型和对我国中部地区一个由集体经济债务压力推动的农地产权制度变迁案例的实证研究，剖析我国农村集体经济制度的根本缺陷和“三农”问题的制度根源，并为农村集体经济组织和农地产权制度改...

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