董事会政治关联、股利政策与企业价值

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浙江财经学院硕士学位论文

摘要

董事负责企业经营管理与决策制定，其政治关联作为一项资源，如同股权状

况和治理结构一样具有重要作用。我国作为一个由集中的计划管理体制转轨到市

场经济的国家，政府对市场影响巨大，大量的上市公司董事具有政府背景，并且

这种趋势还在不断发展。因此，研究董事会政治关联对公司经营绩效的影响这一

问题很有意义。

国内外学者研究发现，政治关联既可能提升企业绩效又可能对企业价值产生

负面影响。并进一步探究了政治关联对企业价值的影响机制，试图深入发掘政治

关联对企业价值产生不同影响结果的作用机制。通过分析，学者们在实证上对政

治关联提升企业价值的作用机制进行了证明，包括政治关联的融资便利性效应、

税收优惠效应和管制突破效应等。但关于政治关联对企业价值的降低机制方面研

究很少，代表性的观点是政治关联高管经营管理能力的缺失和政治关联维持成本

过高等，并且这些观点只是停留在猜想层面，并没有经过实证证明。因此，对我

国上市公司政治关联与企业价值间关系以及对企业价值产生降低作用的影响机制

方面进行实证研究显得十分必要。

本文以我国 2007 年之前 A 股非金融类上市公司为样本，采用 2008 年年报数

据，并剔除 ST 企业和借壳上市企业。通过设定股利政策模型和企业价值模型，利

用多元线性回归方法，对董事会政治关联、现金股利政策和企业价值间关系进行

探究。

结果显示：（1）在董事会政治关联对现金股利政策影响方面。总体政治关联

和直接政治关联能够显著提升现金分红率，而间接政治关联与现金分红之间关系

并不显著。将样本划分为国企和民企后，结果存在着明显的差异：在国企中，只

有政府部门工作经历董事才能提升现金分红水平；而对于民企来说，所有直接政

治背景和政府顾问类董事都能够提升现金分红率，但行业协会背景董事却对现金

分红有负面效应。（2）在董事会政治关联本身及其通过现金股利政策对企业价值

的影响方面。总体上，政府部门工作经历和政府顾问类董事都能显著提升企业价

值，而人大政协背景和行业协会背景董事对企业价值并没有显著影响。总体政治

关联和间接政治关联与现金分红的交叉作用能够显著降低企业价值，直接政治关

联与现金分红的交叉变量对企业价值影响并不明显。对于国企和民企来说：在民

企中，政治关联对企业价值的影响与总体样本的结果相同；在国企中，政府部门

工作经历董事与企业价值间并不存在显著关系。另外，在国企和民企中，所有政

治关联与现金分红的交叉作用对企业价值都没有显著影响，但相对来说，直接政

治关联与现金分红的交叉作用对民企价值的降低作用更为明显，而间接政治关联

对国企价值的降低作用更为明显。（3）在不同市场化水平下的政治关联与现金分

浙江财经学院硕士学位论文

红和企业价值间关系方面。在高市场化水平地区，各类政治关联对企业价值的提

升作用并不显著，而总体政治关联通过现金分红能够显著降低企业价值；在低市

场化水平地区，董事会政治关联能够显著提升企业价值，而政治关联通过现金分

红机制对企业价值的降低作用并不显著。

本文研究具有一定的探索性，创新点主要体现在以下几个方面：本文选题具

有一定的新颖性，较早地在国内对董事会政治关联、现金股利政策和企业价值三

者间关系进行了研究，并对国企和民企进行了对比分析，还研究了不同市场化水

平下政治关联作用水平。在变量选择上：首先，本文将政治关联划分为直接政治

关联和间接政治关联两大类，并分别包括两小类。与此前研究相比，本文对政治

关联的划分更加细化和深入；其次，在对政治关联的度量上，本文以政治关联董

事比例来表示董事会政治关联的程度，这克服了虚拟变量只能衡量是否具有政治

关联的缺陷；另外，在分析中还控制了行业变量和市场化程度的影响。

本文的分析具有如下理论和实践意义：首先，对企业股东来说，在选择管理

者时，不能盲目地为了实行政治策略而任意选择政治关联董事。本文研究发现，

政治关联虽能提升企业价值，但具体到不同政治关联类型和不同性质企业来说，

这种影响是不同的。其次，对资本市场参与者来说，如果是倾向于获得稳定分红

收益的投资者，除了分析企业财务指标外，还可通过对董事会政治关联的考察选

出心仪的投资对象。此外，本文的部分结论也可为企业管理者提供参考。如本文

发现目前我国企业的财务杠杆普遍偏高，并对企业价值产生了负面影响，这对企

业财务结构安排具有借鉴意义。

关键词：董事会；政治关联；股利政策；企业价值

浙江财经学院硕士学位论文

III

ABSTRACT

Director is responsible for enterprise's management and decision-making, his

political connection as resources, as equity status and governance structure, plays an

important role in the enterprise. As a centralized management system country who

transformed into the market economy, government has enormous influence to the

market in china. Therefore, the study of the relationship between political connection

and enterprise value is very meaningful.

Scholars found that political connection may improve enterprise performance, and

may have negative influence to enterprise value either. And further exploring of the

mechanism of this influence has been done, trying to find that through what the

political connection affect enterprise value. Through the analysis, scholars empirically

proved that political connection can improve enterprise value, including the financing

convenience effect, the preferential tax effect and control breakthrough effect, etc. But

the empirical study about why political connection can reduce enterprise value is rarely,

representative viewpoint is that political connection manager's capacity is low and the

high cost of maintaining political connection, and these ideas just stay in the conjecture,

without empirically proof. Therefore, Study the relationship between political

connection and enterprise value, and the mechanism of political connection reduce

enterprise value of China's listed companies is very necessary.

Using the samples of 2008, eliminate financial enterprises, ST enterprises and

delisting enterprise. Through setting cash dividend model and enterprise value model,

using the Multivariate linear regression analysis method to study the relationship

between political relations on board, cash dividend and the enterprise value.

The conclusion of this article is as follows: (1) Overall and direct political

connection can improve cash dividend rates, indirect political connection doesn't have

this effect. Only government working experience directors can ascend cash dividends

in state-owned enterprises, but for the private enterprises, all direct and government

adviser directors can ascend cash dividends, but industry association executive

background directors have negative effects. (2) Overall, the government working

experience and government adviser directors can significantly improve enterprise

value. NPC and CPPCC, and industry association executive have no significant

influence. Overall and indirectly political connection associated with cash dividends

can significantly reduce enterprise value, direct political connection associated with

浙江财经学院硕士学位论文

cash dividends have no significant influence. In state-owned enterprises, there is not

significant relationship between government working experience directors and

enterprise value. In addition, all political connection associated with cash dividends

have no significant influence to enterprise value, but relatively, the direct politics

connection associated with cash dividends is more obviously in private enterprises, and

the indirect political connection associated with cash dividends is more obviously in

state-owned enterprises. (3) In the high marketization level regions, all kinds of

political connection can't influence enterprise value, but overall political connection

through cash dividends can significantly reduce enterprise value. In low marketization

level regions, all political connection can significantly improve enterprise value, and

the political connection associated with cash dividends have no significant influence to

enterprise value.

This article has certain exploratory, contributions are mainly embodied in the

following aspects: the topic has certain novelty, studies the relationship between

political connection, cash dividend and enterprise value earlierly in domestic. In the

variable selection: Firstly, political connection is divided into directly and indirectly

political connection. Compared with the previous studies, the variable discuss is more

deeply. Secondly, in the measure of political connection, we use the political

connection directors proportion, it can overcome virtual variable's defects. In addition,

industry variables and degree of marketization was controled in analysis.

The conclusions of this paper have following theoretical and practical significance:

Firstly, when choosing managers, the shareholders should not blindly to implement

political strategy to select directors who have political connection. This study found

that, although political connection can improve enterprise value, but to the different

types and different political connection, the effect is different. Secondly, as capital

market participants, if they tend to obtain stable dividends income, besides analysis

financial index, the investigation of political connection is also important. In addition,

the conclusion can provide reference to the managers. Such as we find that the

enterprise's financial leverage is higher, and has negative effects to enterprise value, it

can provide reference to enterprise financial arrangement.

Keywords: Board; Political Connection; Dividend Policy; Enterprise Value

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摘要：

浙江财经学院硕士学位论文I摘要董事负责企业经营管理与决策制定，其政治关联作为一项资源，如同股权状况和治理结构一样具有重要作用。我国作为一个由集中的计划管理体制转轨到市场经济的国家，政府对市场影响巨大，大量的上市公司董事具有政府背景，并且这种趋势还在不断发展。因此，研究董事会政治关联对公司经营绩效的影响这一问题很有意义。国内外学者研究发现，政治关联既可能提升企业绩效又可能对企业价值产生负面影响。并进一步探究了政治关联对企业价值的影响机制，试图深入发掘政治关联对企业价值产生不同影响结果的作用机制。通过分析，学者们在实证上对政治关联提升企业价值的作用机制进行了证明，包括政治关联的融资便利性效应、税收...

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