利益集团视角下改革的拖延与突破新探——基于马尔可夫均衡分析

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浙江财经学院硕士学位论文

摘要

改革进程是利益集团围绕利益的博弈过程，也是一个权利的逐步调整和制度

变迁的政治过程。改革的拖延与突破是体制变革的动力和阻力角逐的结果，危机

冲击下利益集团之间的妥协是改革推进的主要原因之一。在中国 30 年渐进式的体

制转型中，既有顺利的、快速推进的成功案例，也有因无法解决日益严重的利益

冲突而引致改革延迟、搁浅或陷入僵局状态。当前中国的改革正处于深水区，进

一步的深化改革必触动原有利益格局和加大社会冲突，因此，在体制改革的很多

重要的方面上都捉襟见肘、停滞不前。危机和体制转型之间不存在一种决定性的

关系，但危机加快改革是不争的事实。尽管次贷危机已过，但危机的阴影依然存

在，这为我们进行下一步的综合性改革提供了契机和条件。

文章的逻辑思路和主要内容如下。本文从利益集团的行为出发，结合中国体

制转型的背景，以改革动力和阻力为基础，对我国改革进程中的利益冲突与制度

变革的关系进行全面而系统的研究并对改革这一政治过程进行经济学的分析。在

对改革拖延现象的解释上，文章研究框架的着力点是等级地位下利益集团的权利

博弈，以此来揭示这一政治过程的基本机制并试图提供危机冲击对改革突破的一

般作用机理，以期对推动改革有所裨益。

首先对问题的提出、研究的背景与意义、论文的创新与不足等做一个简洁的

描述，在此基础上分别从国内和国外两个角度对研究现状进行文献述评。其次，

从文章的视角和着眼点出发来探讨利益集团及其对改革政策的影响，并涉及到政

治自由和经济自由关系下我国利益集团发展的趋向问题。再次，本文对改革拖延

与突破现象的研究上在逻辑上分为理论研究和实证分析两部分，在对改革拖延与

突破现象进行的一般性解释基础上得出其一般机理，从利益博弈的角度对其进行

利益集团之间和利益集团内部两个方面的数理建模，并得出一些理论假说。以国

有银行不良资产改革为例对这些理论假说进行检验，并再次证明危机倒逼和推动

改革。最后，得出文章的结论和一般性的政策原理，并为利用危机所提供的契机

加快改革提出一些建议。

关键字：利益集团；改革拖延和突破；新探；马尔可夫均衡；博弈

浙江财经学院硕士学位论文

ABSTRACT

The reform process is not only a game progress under which the interest groups

game around the interest, but also a gradual adjustment of right and institutional change

of the political process. The reform delay and breakthrough are competitive for

institutional change power against the resistance. Under the shock of Crisis, a

compromise among interest groups is one of the main reasons for reform thrust. In 30

years China’s system of gradual transition, there are both smooth and fast forward the

success reform stories, but some system change is delayed, stranding or stagnant.

because the growing conflict of interests which can not be solved in the reform process.

Current China's reform is at deep-water District; further reform must touch the situation

of interests and increase social conflicts, so in many important aspects of the reform are

both too many difficulties to cope with, or stalled. There does not exist the decisive

relationship between institutional restructuring and the crisis, but the crisis has

accelerated the reform is an indisputable fact. Despite the subprime mortgage crisis has

passed, but the shadow of the crisis still exists, it provides an opportunity and conditions

for us to deepen the comprehensive reform.

This article starting from the behavior of interest groups, combining with the

background of institutional transition in China, based on the reform of motivation and

resistance to study China's reform process. It conducts a comprehensive and systematic

research the relation of interest conflicts and institutional change, and economical

analyses the political reform process. In order to reveal the basic mechanism of this

process and attempts to provide the general mechanism of reform delays and

breakthroughs, expect to benefit of the reform promotion, So interest groups is the focus

of the analytical framework in this paper. First of all, this article concisely describes the

problem, background and significance of the study, the paper's innovation and shortage

and so on. On this basis, this thesis makes Literature Review from the perspective of

domestic and foreign current research. Secondly, starting from the perspective and focus

of the article to explore the interests and the impact of the reform policies, and relate to

the relationship between political freedom and economic freedom in China, under the

tendency the interest groups of development issues. Again, the study of theoretical

research is divided into logic and empirical analysis,on a basis of general interpretation

浙江财经学院硕士学位论文

III

of this phenomenon we can derive general mechanism from reform delay and

breakthrough, mathematically model the interest game from the perspective of interest

groups and interest groups within, and draw some hypotheses. The fourth part Reform

of state-owned banks non-performing assets as an example to test the hypothesis of

these theories, and once again proved the crisis can force reform. Finally, the article

draws the conclusions and the general policy principles for the use of crisis provide an

opportunity to accelerate further reform to provide some suggestions.

Keywords: interest groups; the reform delay and breakthrough; the new research ；

Markova equilibrium; game

浙江财经学院硕士学位论文

绪论

...............................................................................................................................1

0.1 问题的提出........................................................................................................1

0.2 研究的背景和目的............................................................................................2

0.3 本文的重点、难点............................................................................................3

0.4 研究方法、研究框架........................................................................................3

0.5 论文创新之处和不足之处................................................................................4

第一章研究现状与发展前景.......................................................................................6

1.1 国外研究现状的述评........................................................................................6

1.2 国内相关研究....................................................................................................9

1.3 本研究的发展前景..........................................................................................10

第二章利益集团及其对改革政策的影响.................................................................11

2.1 利益集团理论的简要说明和评价..................................................................11

2.2 我国利益集团的演进路径..............................................................................14

2.3 利益集团对改革政策的影响..........................................................................17

第三章改革拖延与突破机理.....................................................................................21

3.1 改革拖延与突破的内在机理..........................................................................21

3.2 利益集团对“共同财产”占有行为下改革的拖延与突破..........................27

3.3 集团成员之间的博弈与改革的拖延..............................................................34

第四章亚洲金融危机下国有银行不良资产改革的突破研究.................................38

4.1 国有银行不良资产改革中的利益集团..........................................................39

4.2 利益集团博弈的模型分析..............................................................................41

4.3 外部冲击促使国有银行不良资产改革突破的形式化..................................46

4.4 国有银行不良资产改革的拖延与突破的一般机理......................................47

4.5 相关结论和政策建议......................................................................................48

第五章文章的结论和政策原理.................................................................................49

参考文献.........................................................................................................................51

附录

.............................................................................................................................57

致谢

.............................................................................................................................60

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摘要：

浙江财经学院硕士学位论文I摘要改革进程是利益集团围绕利益的博弈过程，也是一个权利的逐步调整和制度变迁的政治过程。改革的拖延与突破是体制变革的动力和阻力角逐的结果，危机冲击下利益集团之间的妥协是改革推进的主要原因之一。在中国30年渐进式的体制转型中，既有顺利的、快速推进的成功案例，也有因无法解决日益严重的利益冲突而引致改革延迟、搁浅或陷入僵局状态。当前中国的改革正处于深水区，进一步的深化改革必触动原有利益格局和加大社会冲突，因此，在体制改革的很多重要的方面上都捉襟见肘、停滞不前。危机和体制转型之间不存在一种决定性的关系，但危机加快改革是不争的事实。尽管次贷危机已过，但危机的阴影依然存在，这为我们...

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