农户金融合作行为与农村信用社产权制度的相互关系模型v

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浙江财经学院硕士学位论文

摘要

农村信用社的改革一直是农村金融改革的难点和焦点——尤其是如何结合农

村地区的实际情况以及农民的实际需求来完成新一轮的改革，建立归属明晰的产

权制度、完善内部治理结构。在新一轮农信社产权制度改革过程中农户金融合作

行为一直被忽视，忽视对农户金融合作行为的研究以及农村金融改革过程中排斥

农户参与一直是理论界和实践操作中存在的问题，这在很大程度上导致了一次次

的农信社改革都不尽人意。因此，我们有必要站在直接受益者农户的立场上来研

究这个问题。从理论和实证两方面对农户金融合作行为展开细致全面地研究，不

仅为全面评估农信社改革绩效提供了理论基础和现实基础，而且为农信社的进一

步改革提供了理论支持和实证支持。

首先，本文对历次农信社改革进行了一个简单的回顾，并对本次农信社改革

的成效从正反两面进行评述。虽然，数字上显示近年来农信社无论是在资产质量

还是盈利水平上都有了很大的进步，但是与国内其它银行类金融机构相比还是存

在很大的差距。农信社改革还是未取得预期的成效。

其次，从制度经济学和博弈论视角对农户金融合作行为与农信社产权制度改

革的内在逻辑关系进行了阐述。此次农信社改革是强制性制度变迁，忽略了农户

的金融需求和金融合作意愿，使得农户被孤立在改革之外。通过两个博弈模型论

证了现行的改革中央政府不能代表农户的利益，需要一个中间目标变量，并将这

个中间变量纳入到中央政府激励函数中，来制约地方政府的行为。

再次，通过结构方程模型对农户金融合作行为进行实证研究。这部分是本文

的重点。该模型包含了 5 个结构变量，分别为农户金融合作行为（cooperation）、

农户个人特征（personality）、家庭社会地位（status）、贷款信息（lending）、

对信用社的满意度（satisfaction），每个变量有若干个观测变量。利用实地问卷

调查的数据对农户金融合作行为进行实证分析，得出下面几个结论：（1）半数以

上的农户将农信社看成农民自己的金融机构，可是入股人数却少之又少；（2）不

同地区的农户金融需求存在较大的差异，因此我们要注意地域差异、因地制宜；（3）

相对于农户自身特征，外因对农户金融合作行为影响更大；（4）农户没有入股农

信社的主要原因还是对入股相关情况不了解、不关心。

接着，就合作制和股份制之争对三种产权制度各自的特点进行描述，通过层

次分析法将农户金融合作行为、农信社的可持续发展、服务“三农”以及支持地

方经济发展纳入到农信社产权制度决定模型中。以一个发达地区和一个欠发达地

区为例，指出不同地区的需求侧重点不同，适应的产权制度也不尽相同。

最后，根据理论和实证两方面的研究，提出几点深化农信社改革的政策建议。

浙江财经学院硕士学位论文

认为：（1）要重视对农户金融合作行为的研究；（2）基于农户金融合作行为的产

权制度改革；（3）坚持因地制宜原则；（4）升级农信社产品服务体系。

目前，由于国内外将农户金融合作行为与农村信用社产权制度结合起来进行

研究的文献极少，所以本项目的选题本身就是创新，也就是说本研究具有很强的

探索性。本项目利用结构方程模型建立农户金融合作行为模型，并通过大量调查

获得第一手资料来进行实证检验。这是本项目研究方法创新之处。

关键词：农村信用社；博弈模型；结构方程；层次分析法；农户金融合作行为；

产权制度

ABSTRACT

浙江财经学院硕士学位论文

III

Reform of rural credit cooperatives has been the difficulties and focuses of

financial reform in rural areas, especially on how to combine the actual situation in rural

areas and farmers’ actual need to complete the new-round reform, establish clear

property rights and improve the internal governance structure. In the new-round of

property rights system reform of rural credit cooperatives, farmers’ financial

cooperation behavior has always been neglected. Ignorance of farmers’ financial

cooperation behavior and exclusion of farmers involved in rural financial reform has

been problems in theory and practice. Therefore we need to study this problem on

behalf of farmers who are the direct beneficiaries. The Study of farmers’ financial

cooperation behavior from both theoretical and empirical perspectives, not only

provided theoretical basis and practice basis for a comprehensive assessment of reform

performance, but also provided theoretical and empirical supports for further reform.

Firstly, this paper makes a simple review of all previous rural credit cooperatives’

reforms and assesses the effectiveness of this reform from both sides. Although the

figures show that rural credit cooperatives have made great progress both in asset

quality and profitability in recent years. But there is still a big gap comparing with other

domestic financial institutions. Reform of rural credit cooperatives doesn’t achieve the

expected results.

Secondly, from the perspective of institutional economics and game theory, the

internal logic relationship between farmers’ financial cooperation behaviors and rural

credit cooperatives’ property rights reform is studied. The reform is mandatory system

changes, which ignores farmers’ financial needs and financial cooperation desire,

forcing farmers to be isolated from reform. Demonstrated by two game models, the

central government can’t represent farmers’ interest under current reform . We need a

target variable to restrain the behavior of local government and incorporate it into

excitation function.

Thirdly, this essay studies famers’ financial cooperation behaviors through SEM.

The SEM model contains five structural variables, namely cooperation, personality,

status, lending and satisfaction. Each variable has a number of observed variables.

Using filed survey data empirical analysis of farmers’ financial cooperation behaviors,

we find that:(1) more than half of farmers see the rural credit cooperatives as their own

financial institutions, but the number of farmers who buy shares is few;(2) there is a big

difference among financial needs of farmers in different areas;(3)relative to farmers own

characteristics, external factors has a greater influence on farmers cooperation

浙江财经学院硕士学位论文

behaviors;(4)the main reason for farmers without shares is that farmers don’t understand

relevant information.

Fourthly, based on distinctive features between joint-stock and cooperative

systems ,the characteristics of three property rights systems has been described

here ,which incorporate farmers’ financial cooperation behaviors, sustainable

development of rural cooperatives, service for” issues concerning agriculture,

countryside and farmers ” and support local economic development into the decision

model of the rural credit cooperatives Property through AHP. Taking a developed area

and a less developed area as examples to point out that the emphases of needs are

different in different regions , and the suitable property systems are also different.

Finally, based on both theoretical and empirical studies, this paper raises policy

recommendations for deepen reform. That includes: (1) paying attention to farmers’

financial cooperation behaviors; (2) the property system reform based on farmer

financial cooperation behaviors; (3) adhering to the principle of adaptation to local

conditions;

(4) Upgrading product service system of rural credit cooperatives.

At present, there is few literature research of rural credit cooperatives combining

with farmers’ cooperation behaviors at home and broad. So the topic of this paper is

innovative in itself which is highly exploratory. The paper uses SEM to establish

farmers’ cooperation behaviors model and obtain first-hand information through surveys.

This is the methodology innovation of this paper.

Keywords: rural credit cooperatives; game model; SEM; AHP; farmers’ financial

cooperation behaviors; property system

浙江财经学院硕士学位论文

第一章导论..................................................................................................................... 1

第一节背景与意义......................................................................................................1

第二节国内外相关研究的文献综述..........................................................................2

第三节本文的研究框架及创新点............................................................................10

第二章农村信用社产权制度改革评述....................................................................... 12

第一节农村信用社发展过程....................................................................................12

第二节新一轮农村信用社改革评价........................................................................14

第三章农户金融合作行为与农村信用社产权制度的相互关系............................... 22

第一节农户金融合作行为与农村信用社产权制度之间的....................................22

理论分析框架..............................................................................................................22

第二节中央政府与地方政府、农信社之间的博弈................................................24

第三节中央政府、地方政府、农信社及农户四方博弈........................................26

第四节基于博弈分析的结论....................................................................................28

第四章农户金融合作行为实证研究........................................................................... 30

第一节理论模型与研究假设....................................................................................30

第二节问卷调查简单统计结果................................................................................33

第三节农户金融合作行为影响因素的实证分析....................................................41

第四节假设检验及结论............................................................................................55

第五章内生性产权制度决定模型............................................................................... 57

第一节层次分析模型的构建....................................................................................57

第二节层次模型分析..............................................................................................62

第三节基于层次分析的几点结论............................................................................67

第六章基于农户金融合作行为的农信社产权制度改革........................................... 68

的政策建议..................................................................................................................... 68

第一节重视对农户金融合作行为的研究................................................................68

第二节基于农户金融合作行为的产权制度改革....................................................68

第三节坚持因地制宜原则........................................................................................69

第四节升级农信社产品服务体系............................................................................69

参考文献......................................................................................................................... 71

附录

............................................................................................................................... 74

致谢

............................................................................................................................... 78

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摘要：

浙江财经学院硕士学位论文I摘要农村信用社的改革一直是农村金融改革的难点和焦点——尤其是如何结合农村地区的实际情况以及农民的实际需求来完成新一轮的改革，建立归属明晰的产权制度、完善内部治理结构。在新一轮农信社产权制度改革过程中农户金融合作行为一直被忽视，忽视对农户金融合作行为的研究以及农村金融改革过程中排斥农户参与一直是理论界和实践操作中存在的问题，这在很大程度上导致了一次次的农信社改革都不尽人意。因此，我们有必要站在直接受益者农户的立场上来研究这个问题。从理论和实证两方面对农户金融合作行为展开细致全面地研究，不仅为全面评估农信社改革绩效提供了理论基础和现实基础，而且为农信社的进一步改革提供了理...

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