我国民间行业协会激励机制研究

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浙江财经学院硕士学位论文

摘要

经济问题研究的一个重要课题是对组织的研究，经济的发展以组织的良性发

展为前提，行业协会近年来的积极举动引起了政府部门和学术界广泛的关注，行

业协会发挥了政府和市场所不能及的作用，但让我感兴趣的是在现实中为何部分

行业协会不能很好的为会员企业服务，那么何种激励机制可以提高行业协会为会

员企业服务的效率，从而更大程度的发挥行业协会的功能。带着这个问题，笔者

查阅了相关文献并进行了调查和思考。

首先介绍中国行业协会的历史发展并对与行业协会相关的概念给以界定，对

任何一个事物进行研究必须对其历史发展有清楚的了解，在历史中发现事物发展

的规律并从中汲取相关经验，从国家和我国地方两个层次中相关法规对行业协会

的定义中寻找共同的规律，在此基础上结合本文所研究的内容得出本文对行业协

会的定义。同时根据行业协会权利制衡与监督的原则，确立了行业协会的组织结

构，同时介绍了我国行业协会与营利性组织激励机制的特殊性问题。

其次是组织的发展依赖于组织负责人的能力和态度，调动负责人的积极性是

行业协会效率提升的一个重要方面，在营利性组织中物质激励具有良好效果，但

在具有收入不可分配性的行业协会中，物质激励不具有客观基础。在“经济人”

假设的前提下，行业协会负责人物质利益的满足得不到实现，必将对精神需求提

出要求，其中主要对声誉的需求。市场经济是建立在道德基础上的，个人声誉即

是市场诚信交易者的信号，在市场经济中诚信是具有经济价值的，这就是行业协

会负责人在不能取得物质报酬的情形下会转向对社会声誉的需求，而这种精神报

酬不仅可以满足其作为社会人所要求的个人社会满足感，同时可以为其在市场交

易中获得经济利益。在预期到这种良性循环的利益报酬链时，行业协会负责人将

会投入足够的精力和时间在工作岗位上。

再次行业协会效率的提升不仅和行业协会负责人有关，而且与行业中企业的

参与积极性有关，只有当具有共同利益目标的企业全部加入行业协会中时，行业

协会才能做到事半功倍的效果，若企业不加入协会则会影响到行业协会的规模效

应和其他会员企业的收益。社会资本作为一种不同于人力资本的资本，在我国的

社会经济生活中扮演着重要的角色，行业协会可以通过提供丰裕的社会资本积累

机会和途径来克服企业在公共产品博弈阶段的“搭便车”行为。

最后针对行业协会负责人和会员企业在追求利益的过程中，由于二者追求的

浙江财经学院硕士学位论文

利益目标不同和行业协会内部性的存在，使得二者之间会产生利益冲突，对这一

冲突的解决是行业协会良性运转和健康发展的关键，也是论文所讨论的提高行业

协会效率的关键，从产生利益冲突的原因中试图寻求解决二者冲突的途径，提出

了一个内外部相结合的解决框架，解决途径不是很完善，仍然值得继续探讨。

本文以产业组织理论为基本框架，运用博弈论、信息经济学等现代经济理论，

以中国行业协会的具体结构为基础，采用理论与案例相结合的方法，构建理论分

析的博弈模型，分别从行业协会负责人和会员入会激励两方面来研究中国的行业

协会激励问题，从而提高我国行业协会为会员企业服务的能力，并较好的承接政

府部门转移的职能。

关键词：行业协会；声誉理论；关联博弈；激励机制

浙江财经学院硕士学位论文

ABSTRACT

It is important for economic problems that the organization’s research, recently ,

government and academic has attracted widespread attraction to business association.

how to motivate the executive level in such an organization with un-distributable

income comes out to be a problem. At the same time the head of industry associations

can not be obtained in any of the material compensation, on the contrary, as head of

trade association members must pay more contributions than the average, The industrial

associations must give its heads some incentives in order to gain futher development.

However, how to give proper incentives in this income difficult to measure trade has

been a problem.With these two issues, the author reviewed the literature and conducted

an investigation and reflection.

Chapter II describes the history of China ‘s industry associations and the

structure of industry association.

Chapter III .In order to promote itself for a better prospect, industry associations

must offer a certain degree of motivation to the executive level of the association,

however, how to motivate the executive level in such an organization with

un-distributable income comes out to be a problem. Based on the reputation theory, the

thesis conclude that with the purpose of accumulating good reputation, people in charge

of the industry association will make effort for collective interests using dynamic game

playing theory, correspondingly economic benefits will be brought by reputation in the

process of trading, this positive cycling will motivate people in charge of the industry

associations with hidden effect that can not be replaced by material.

Chapter IV is the incentive mechanism of the member of business association.

Only when all companies join into business association, industry associations can

achieve a multiplier effect, if some companies did not join the trade association ,it will

affect the economies of scale and other member companies’s benefit. Enterprises can be

"free rider" situation, industry associations can provide more opportunities and channels

for the accumulation of social capital,it can solve the public goods’s problem.

Chapter V arise propose solutions framework to solve the Leader of trade

association and member companies with a conflict of interest.we summarized the four

浙江财经学院硕士学位论文

types of conflict of interest, industry associations responsible for the overall

interests ,but member companies to consider the interests of their own enterprises ,

business association must build a formwork to solve the confliction.

Chapter VI is a summary of the article, meantime,because of these problems , this

paper also proposed some counter measures that can be taken by the Government.

In this paper, the basic framework of the theory of industrial organization , game

theory, information economics, new institutional economics theory study of modern

economics theory, the reality of China's business association as the research object,

using the case research and practice the right of the reputation theory and collect game

theory. Finally ,we drawn a universal law and policy implications.

Keywords: Business association;Reputation theory; Collected game; Incentive

mechanism

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摘要：

浙江财经学院硕士学位论文3摘要经济问题研究的一个重要课题是对组织的研究，经济的发展以组织的良性发展为前提，行业协会近年来的积极举动引起了政府部门和学术界广泛的关注，行业协会发挥了政府和市场所不能及的作用，但让我感兴趣的是在现实中为何部分行业协会不能很好的为会员企业服务，那么何种激励机制可以提高行业协会为会员企业服务的效率，从而更大程度的发挥行业协会的功能。带着这个问题，笔者查阅了相关文献并进行了调查和思考。首先介绍中国行业协会的历史发展并对与行业协会相关的概念给以界定，对任何一个事物进行研究必须对其历史发展有清楚的了解，在历史中发现事物发展的规律并从中汲取相关经验，从国家和我国地方两个层次中相...

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