资本结构与产能过剩形成机理研究——以我国钢铁行业为例

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浙江财经学院硕士学位论文

摘要

产能过剩近年来一直困扰着中国经济的发展，尤其是金融危机发生以来，产

能过剩问题更加突出，引起各方的高度关注，并再次成为政策部门的工作重点。

我国长期以来以包括市场准入、项目审批、目录指导、供地审批、贷款的行政核

准、强制性清理等管制手段来治理重复建设、过度竞争、产能过剩问题，但是治

理效果并不好，产能过剩问题始终得不到根本性解决。而对于产能过剩的形成原

因，有关学者主要是从需求供给、政策、市场等方面来研究的，却在根本上忽视

了对组成市场的微观主体企业的资本结构特征进行研究。资本结构不仅仅体现了

企业资本的不同来源，还影响到企业权力在各个利益主体间的分布关系，决定了

各利益主体所受到的约束与激励的强度，最终决定了企业的投资行为。因此，本

文试图从企业的资本结构差异解释企业的过度投资行为，进而得出长期性产能过

剩的形成机理。

在探讨资本结构与企业的投资行为关系的文献中，股东与经理人之间的利益

冲突导致经理人具有过度投资的倾向是学者关注的焦点，并认为负债融资能够起

到相机治理的作用，抑制经理人的过度投资行为。但是，本文研究发现，产能过

剩的行业由于其市场结构和制度结构的特定特征，形成了特殊性的企业资本结构，

也就是在激烈的竞争环境中，企业以高负债的战略承诺效应应对竞争，而在以国

有股为绝对主体的股权结构中，国有股产权失位导致股东与经理人之间的代理成

本问题加剧，经理人普遍具有投资扩张的冲动，在高负债的资本结构下，扭曲企

业的投资激励，企业的过度投资行为更加严重。加之地方政府由于经济指标的考

核以及政治晋升的需要，以低廉的土地价格、金融资源及各项优惠政策支持企业

的投资行为，负债融资的相机治理更是难以发挥作用，企业的过度投资得以延续，

并最终导致产能过剩的危机。

为了证实本文的观点，文章一方面建立数理模型证明资本结构与企业过度投

资激励的逻辑关系，另一方面采用自由现金流的代理成本模型，从股权结构及负

债融资的相机治理作用的角度进行实证检验。从描述性检验结果发现，钢铁上市

企业是以国有控股企业为主体，同时上市企业的资本负债率普遍较高；从面板数

据的检验结果分析，钢铁行业的上市企业普遍具有过度投资的行为，并且负债融

资难以实现有效的治理作用。进一步分析发现，相比于非地方国有和民营控股企

业，地方政府控制的国有企业过度投资行为更加严重，债务融资更是不能抑制地

方国有企业的过度投资行为，因而验证了论文的观点。最后，根据理论分析及实

浙江财经学院硕士学位论文

证检验结果，提出改善公司治理机制，提高企业投资效率；改革政府官员政绩考

核及晋升机制，实现地方政府的角色转型；深化国有企业改革，建立公平竞争的

市场环境三个方面治理产能过剩问题。

关键词：资本结构；产能过剩；过度投资；地方政府

浙江财经学院硕士学位论文

III

ABSTRACT

The economic development of China has been plagued by overcapacity in recent

years, especially since the financial crisis, the problem of overcapacity is more

prominent and once again become the focus of policy departments. China has long been

including market access, project approval, directory guide, land approval, administrative

approval of the loan, mandatory clean-up and other means to control repetitive

construction and excessive competition, overcapacity. But the effect is not good,

overcapacity problem has not been fundamentally resolved. And for the cause of

formation of the overcapacity, scholars mainly from the demand, the policies, market

research, etc, but fundamentally on capital structure characteristics were studied. Capital

structure not only embodies enterprise capital from different sources, also affect the

enterprise power in every stakeholder relations, the benefits of constraint and incentive

intensity, so that determines the enterprise's investment behavior. Therefore, this article

tries to explain the differences between enterprise capital structure, over-investment

enterprises and the formation mechanism of long-term overcapacity.

The capital structure and the enterprise's investment behavior in the literature, the

conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders make managers have the

tendency to over-investment, that is the focus of the scholars to study, and debt

financing can play the role to inhibit the excessive investment of managers. However,

this study found that, due to overproduction of industry has its market structure and

system structure of the specific characteristics, so formed the particularity of capital

structure of the enterprises. The reason is that in the fierce competitive environment,

companies with high debt have the strategic commitment effect in response competition,

and state-owned shares as the absolute subject of the ownership structure, but the

state-owned shares of property rights out of position led to the shareholders and

managers between the agency costs increase. Because of the distortion of investment

incentives for business, managers have universal impulse to expansion of investment in

high-debt capital structure, with enterprise exist more serious over-investment behavior,

and as the assessment of economic indicators and political promotion needs, the

regional government has incentives to supply lower price of land ,financial resources

and various preferential policies to support enterprise's over-investment , so that debt

financing is even more difficult to play a role in governance, and eventually lead to

overcapacity crisis.

浙江财经学院硕士学位论文

To prove this point of view, this paper established the mathematical model on the

proof of the logical relationship between capital structure and over-investment

incentives; and used the free cash flow and the agency cost model from the ownership

structure and the debt financing governance role for empirical test. Test results showed

from the description that listed companies are state-controlled iron and steel enterprises

as the mainstay, the gearing ratio of listed companies were generally high; the test

results from panel data analysis that listed companies in the steel industry generally

have over-investment behavior, and debt financing is difficult to achieve effective

governance role. Further analysis found that, compared to the non-local-controlled and

private enterprises, the local state-controlled have more serious over-investment

behavior, and debt financing is more difficult to inhibit the over-investment behavior,

and thus verify the paper's viewpoint. Finally, according to the theoretical analysis and

empirical test results, put forward to from three aspects to governance overcapacity.

Firstly we should improve corporate governance mechanism and improve the efficiency

of investment enterprises. Secondly reform government officials and promotion

mechanism examinational and realize the transformation of the role of the local

government. Finally deep the reform of state-owned enterprises and establish the market

environment of fair competition.

Keywords：capital structure；overcapacity；overinvestment；regional government

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摘要：

浙江财经学院硕士学位论文I摘要产能过剩近年来一直困扰着中国经济的发展，尤其是金融危机发生以来，产能过剩问题更加突出，引起各方的高度关注，并再次成为政策部门的工作重点。我国长期以来以包括市场准入、项目审批、目录指导、供地审批、贷款的行政核准、强制性清理等管制手段来治理重复建设、过度竞争、产能过剩问题，但是治理效果并不好，产能过剩问题始终得不到根本性解决。而对于产能过剩的形成原因，有关学者主要是从需求供给、政策、市场等方面来研究的，却在根本上忽视了对组成市场的微观主体企业的资本结构特征进行研究。资本结构不仅仅体现了企业资本的不同来源，还影响到企业权力在各个利益主体间的分布关系，决定了各利益主体所受...

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